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ABSTRACT  
   
Collaborative learning is a common teaching strategy in classrooms across 
age groups and content areas. It is important to measure and understand the 
cognitive process involved during collaboration to improve teaching methods 
involving interactive activities. This research attempted to answer the question: 
why do students learn more in collaborative settings? Using three measurement 
tools, 142 participants from seven different biology courses at a community 
college and at a university were tested before and after collaborating about the 
biological process of natural selection. Three factors were analyzed to measure 
their effect on learning at the individual level and the group level. The three 
factors were: difference in prior knowledge, sex and religious beliefs. Gender and 
religious beliefs both had a significant effect on post-test scores. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Collaborative learning is an effective learning strategy that is becoming a 
common part of the curriculum used in classrooms across subjects and age 
groups.  Where students in other settings work at their desks to receive instruction 
in which most interaction occurs between teacher and student, the key feature of 
collaborative learning that distinguishes it from other learning settings is the 
interaction between the students (Roschelle, 1992; Webb, 1982). In the science 
education literature, when collaborative groups are compared to individuals in a 
lecture format, the participants in the collaborative groups often outperform their 
individual counterparts (Doymus, 2008; Diane Ebert-May, Brewer, & Allred, 
1997; Fischer & Mandl, 2005; Jensen & Finley, 1996; Roschelle & Teasley, 
1994; Stahl, 2000). This result has been presented in several reviews (Johnson, 
1981; Sharan, 1980; Slavin, 1977). This is not surprising considering the 
cognitive benefits that individuals gain from learning interactively (Dolmans & 
Schmidt, 1996). 
The benefits of learning collaboratively are not new. In 1932 John Dewey 
pioneered the idea of an interactive environment in the classroom when he 
proposed that education is a social process (Dewey, 1932). Dewey described 
inquiry as a “reflective transformation of perception, thought, and action” 
(Roschelle, 1992). Inquiry requires social interaction (Schun, 1979). An 
individual is able to make sense of information by transforming ideas into a more 
coherent knowledge structure (or mental model) through inquiry. Lev Vygotsky 
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was another major influence on social learning with his social constructivist 
theory. His theory stated that social interaction plays a fundamental role in the 
process of cognitive development and learning (Vygotsky, 1978). He argued that 
advanced concepts first appear during social interaction, and only gradually 
become available to an individual (Roschelle & Goldman, 1992). Furthermore, he 
described the Zone of Proximal Development (ZPD), which is the difference 
between what an individual can do without help and what the individual can do 
with help through interaction with others. In the ZPD an individual can participate 
slightly above his or her own individual capability (Roschelle & Goldman, 1992). 
These fundamental theories set a conceptual foundation for collaborative learning 
benefits. 
Despite the numerous studies examining collaboration, there is no 
explanation as to why students are able to learn more effectively in a collaborative 
setting. The motivation of this dissertation is to answer the following question: 
What specific factors contribute to the successes gained from collaborative 
learning? In this research I analyzed students’ learning about the biological 
process of Natural Selection in a collaborative setting. This research had two 
aims, first to design a sensitive tool to measure learning and second, to identify 
the factor(s) that contribute towards a positive learning outcome in a collaborative 
setting. 
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Aim 1: Measuring Learning 
There are numerous science education studies involving the evolutionary 
topic of Natural Selection. In this dissertation, learning is defined by the 
difference in scores on assessments. From previous studies, there are three types 
of assessments that can be used to measure learning. The three types include a 
multiple-choice test, an essay test or a face-to-face interview between the 
researcher and the individual students (Anderson, Fisher, & Norman, 2002; 
Asterhan & Schwarz, 2007; Bishop & Anderson, 1990; Chan, Burtis, & Bereiter, 
1997; Coleman, Brown, & Rivkin, 1997; Settlage, 1994). In 2008, Nehm did a 
qualitative comparison between three of the instruments commonly used in 
Natural Selection studies. He found that the most accurate measurement tool was 
an open-ended interview to assess students understanding of the concepts in 
natural selection (Nehm & Schonfeld, 2008). However, doing an open interview 
in a large-scale study is not practical.  
For this study, I used three assessments to measure learning. Education 
researchers designed two of the assessments (an essay test and a multiple-choice 
test)(Coleman, Brown & Rivkin, 1997; Anderson, Fisher & Norman, 2002). I 
designed the third assessment, a Mental Model Task. The essay test was used to 
measure learning at the group level (Coleman, Brown & Rivken, 1997) where the 
multiple-choice test and the Mental Model Task were used to measure learning at 
the individual level (Anderson et al., 2002).  The essay assessment was chosen 
because it was designed for a collaborative setting. Reliability was not reported 
and validity was measured using the Content Validity Ratio (CVR) approach 
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(Lawshe, 1975). This method utilized a group of subject-matter experts (SMEs) 
who were asked whether or not each item on the assessment was essential 
(Lawshe, 1975). Lawshe argued that if more than half the panelists indicate that 
an item is essential, that item has at least some content validity. Basically, greater 
levels of content validity exist as greater numbers of panelists agree that an item is 
essential, for this assessment the mean CVR = 1.0. The multiple-choice 
assessment (CINS) was chosen because it was the most common assessment used 
in education studies using the topic of evolution. For the CINS, the reported 
reliability score was KR20 = .58 for section A and KR20 = .64 for section B. 
Despite the authors claim that these reliability scores are moderate, they are low. 
Because of the lack of high-quality instruments, it was my goal, as a component 
of this research, to design a more reliable tool to measure learning in the domain-
specific area of the evolutionary process of Natural Selection. Therefore, as a 
third assessment to measure learning, I used my own tool that evaluated the 
mental model of each student and measured changes at different time-points as 
the student progressed through the collaborative study.  
Ultimately, the goal of this research was to identify which collaborative 
factors affected learning. Utilizing multiple measurement tools resulted in a 
clearer picture as to which factors influenced learning. 
 
Aim 2: Identifying collaborative factors 
When analyzing collaborative learning, there are observable factors that 
can contribute towards effective collaboration. These can be divided into three 
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different categories. First are the input factors which include prior knowledge 
(Hewson & Hewson, 1983; Schmidt, DeVolder, De Grave, Moust, & Patel, 1989), 
sex (Baker, 2002; Woolley, Chabris, Pentland, Hashmi, & Malone, 2010) and 
religious beliefs (Brem, Ranney, & Schindel, 2003; Lombrozo, Shtulman, & 
Weisberg, 2006). Second, the factors involved during the collaboration. These 
include activating prior knowledge, help seeking (Webb, Troper, & Fall, 1995), 
explanation (Chi, Bassok, Lewis, Reimann, & Glaser, 1989), and elaboration 
(Blankenstein, Dolmans, Vleuten, & Schmidt, 2009). Last are the output factors. 
These include retention of knowledge (Dolmans & Schmidt, 1996), transfer 
(Patel, Groen, & Norman, 1991; Schmidt et al., 1996; Tans, Schmidt, Schade-
Hoogeveen, & Gijselaers, 1986) and the creation of new original knowledge 
(Peters & Armstrong, 1998). The research in this dissertation focused on the input 
factors and their effect on collaborative learning.  
When people work together they construct something that did not exist 
before the collaboration. In other words, the result is something that does not and 
cannot fully exist in the individual collaborators and can only emerge from a 
collaborative situation (Peters & Armstrong, 1998). This study attempted at 
understanding this mechanism by analyzing three input factors and their effects 
on learning in a collaborative setting. The three factors to be assessed were: 
difference in prior knowledge, sex and religious beliefs.  
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Prior knowledge.  
There are hints in published work to suggest that when individuals 
collaborate, the difference in prior knowledge brought to the collaboration 
contributes to the success of the collaboration. The hints are found in two areas of 
research: studies about controversy and studies about heterogeneous groups. 
Johnson and Johnson argued that controversy during collaborative learning leads 
to increased motivation, creative insight, cognitive development, and learning 
(Johnson & Johnson, 1979).  By controlling the controversy in group 
collaboration, they promoted conflict, which created cognitive dissonance, which 
in turn encourages modification of knowledge structures (Johnson & Johnson, 
1979). In addition, several researchers have studied heterogeneity of groups. 
Having a heterogeneous group can lead to controversy within a collaborative 
group. Heterogeneous groups were superior to homogenous groups in terms of 
quality of group solution, creativity of group solution and member satisfaction 
with the solution (Amaria, Biran, & Leith, 1969; Jackson et al., 1991; Paul, 
Seetharaman, Samarah, & Mykytyn, 2004; Schultz-Hardt, Jochims, & Frey, 
2002).  
In an attempt to explain why collaborative learning is more beneficial than 
individual learning and more specifically, why heterogeneous groups outperform 
homogenous groups I captured the knowledge structure (i.e. mental model) of 
individuals prior to learning about the biological process of Natural Selection 
collaboratively using the Mental Model Task. Then, I grouped the participants 
into two different groups: dyads with similar mental models or dyads with 
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dissimilar mental models. Different combinations for prior-knowledge-similarity 
within a dyad might lead to different communication and learning processes. One 
goal of my research was to determine whether group composition in terms of 
similarity of prior knowledge is related to the collaborative learning process. 
Heterogeneous pairs should have more to talk about; therefore I theorized that 
dissimilar prior knowledge between collaborators would result in effective group 
performance and an increase in individual learning. 
 
Sex. 
Gender studies have found that sex composition of collaborative groups 
can impact the success of the group in regard to how the collaborators 
communicate with each other (Tucker, Powell, & Meyer, 1995).  A study by 
Woolley found a significant correlation between the numbers of females in a 
group to the collective intelligence (c) of the group. They attributed their finding 
to social sensitivity, a trait where females scored higher compared to males 
(Woolley, Chabris, Pentland, Hashmi & Malone, 2010). In Woolley’s study, the 
groups were asked to perform a series of tasks such as puzzle solving, 
brainstorming, and making collective moral judgments. Several studies examined 
the role of gender in groups performing various tasks (Lorenzi-Cioldi, Eagly, & 
Stewart, 1995; Mast, 2001; Woolley et al., 2010). However, sex composition of 
groups with regard to learning about Evolution Theory needs further examination.  
In an attempt to establish the effect of group-composition based on sex in 
a collaborative learning setting, I grouped students into dyads that varied in 
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arrangement (male-male, female-female and male-female). I looked at both group 
performance and individual learning. In this experiment, I predicted that there 
would be a learning difference depending on the composition of the dyad based 
on sex. Furthermore, I theorized that dyads composed of females would 
outperform dyads composed of males.  
 
Religious beliefs. 
Research in science education has extensively examined teaching 
evolutionary theory and the robust misconceptions that students can acquire 
(Alters & Nelson, 2002; Geraedts & Boersma, 2006; Settlage, 1994). There is also 
a focus in the literature about pre-existing beliefs and their effects on learning 
controversial topics (Chambliss, 1994). The literature confirms that the majority 
of college students do not understand the evolutionary process of natural 
selection. However, the relationship between understanding evolutionary theory 
and accepting it as true needs to be examined (Brem, Ranney, & Schindel, 2003; 
Shtulman, 2006). 
This research attempted to examine the relationship between pre-existing 
religious beliefs and understanding the evolutionary process of Natural Selection. 
In addition, I examined the impact of group composition. I attempted to answer 
the question: Will students that have similar religious beliefs or different religious 
beliefs perform better in a collaborative setting while learning about evolution? 
Students were categorized based on their pre-existing beliefs and placed into three 
groups (creationist, evolutionist or blend). Students who believe that human 
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beings have developed over millions of years from less advanced forms of life 
without the help of God’s guidance were categorized as evolutionists.  Students 
who believe that God created human beings pretty much in their present form 
were categorized as creationists and students who believe that human beings have 
developed over millions of years from less advanced forms of life, but God 
guided this process were categorized as blend. First, I examined if religious 
beliefs had an affect on individual learning. I predicted that there would be a 
difference in learning depending on religious beliefs. Specifically, I theorized that 
students who hold creationist beliefs would be hindered in their ability to 
understand evolutionary theory. Secondly, I examined if the composition of the 
dyad based on religious beliefs had an impact on learning at the group level.  
 
Problem Statement 
Collaborative learning is becoming a common teaching strategy in classrooms 
across age groups and content areas. It is important to measure and understand the 
cognitive process involved during collaboration to improve teaching methods 
involving interactive activities. This research attempted to answer the question: 
why do students learn more in collaborative settings? Therefore, the main goal of 
this dissertation was to build a theory to explain the mechanistic details involved 
in collaboration.  
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Research Questions 
The purpose of this study was to investigate collaborative learning and to examine 
the role of prior knowledge, sex and religious beliefs on the effectiveness of 
learning and collaboration. Four research questions were analyzed: 
1. Does the quality of collaboration have an effect on learning concepts 
about Natural Selection at the individual level and at the group level? 
2. In a collaborative setting, does a difference in prior knowledge increase 
learning concepts about Natural Selection at the individual level and/or at 
the group level? 
3. In a collaborative setting, does sex have an effect on learning concepts 
about Natural Selection at the individual level and/or at the group level? 
4. In a collaborative setting, do religious beliefs have an effect on learning 
concepts about Natural Selection at the individual level and/or at the group 
level? 
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Chapter 2 
LITERATURE 
Mental Models 
Cognitive science is largely based on the idea that the mind operates on an 
internal representation of knowledge, or mental model (Anderson, 2004). It is 
what distinguishes it from behaviorism. This idea dates back to 1943, when Craik 
suggested that the mind constructs “small-scale models” of the world that it uses 
to predict outcomes (Craik, 1943). Theories in cognitive science pertaining to 
mental modes and their effect on learning have evolved through the years. In 
1978, the concept of learning in a cognitive sense was deemed as “vague”, 
“abstract”, and “lacking a substantive data base” (Shuell, 1986). Earlier theories 
were based on operational structures that were compared to computer science, 
such as “the brain is a serial computer” metaphor or “the mind is a computer 
software system” (Hestenes, 2006). Around 1983, cognitive science changed into 
theories involving neural network systems and it was widely accepted that 
thinking involved pattern processing. This is what the majority of the theories are 
today (Hestenes, 2006). A mental model is used to process patterns about 
information. During the learning process, mental models are dynamic and are 
continuously changing and adjusting as individuals interact with the world around 
them. Cognitive researchers today accept a mental model to be “an internal scale-
model representation of an external reality”(Davidson, Dove, & Weltz, 1999). 
Furthermore, acquiring knowledge and deep level learning can be explained by 
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the modification of a mental model (Anderson, 1983). It is under this assumption 
that this dissertation is based. 
In the literature, knowledge structures are referred to in different ways, 
such as: categories (Rosch & Lloyd, 1978), cognitive maps (Axelrod, 1977; Ford 
& Hegarty, 1984; Neisser, 1976; Weick & Bougon, 1986), belief structures (Fiske 
& Taylor, 1991), mental models (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Rouse & Morris, 1986), 
schemas (Anderson & Pichert, 1978; Neisser, 1976; Rumelhart & Norman, 1981) 
and scripts (Abelson, 1976). Although, there are different terms to describe 
mental models, from a cognitive perspective, it is accepted that these structures 
are dynamic and that learning is a result of changes in these structures.  
 
Structure 
Mental models deal with how the human mind organizes and uses 
information about the world (Anderson, 2004). According to Rouse and Morris 
(1986), it is the role of a representation as a conceptual framework for describing, 
explaining, and predicting future events, (even if they are incorrect). In other 
words, mental models are structures that help an individual make sense of their 
surroundings (Johnson-Laird, 1989). But how are these conceptual frameworks 
organized? There are a few theories on the structure of mental representations. 
The most prevalent theory in the literature is the Mental Model Theory first 
developed by Jean Piaget (1962). He was one of the first researchers to define a 
mental model and its structure. He argued that there is evidence for two types of 
mental models, one for imagery called a perception-based knowledge 
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representations and one for reasoning called a meaning-based knowledge 
representations (Anderson, 2004; Johnson-Laird, 1989).  
Perception-based knowledge deals with the way that visual and verbal 
information is represented and processed in the absence of an external perceptual 
stimulus. Processing mental perceptual knowledge is called imagery and can 
involve a very vivid experience. For example, when a person visualizes 
himself/herself defending a dissertation, they can “see” and “hear” all the details 
of an imagined experience. Furthermore, it has been long proven that there are 
separate representations for verbal and visual information that are processed in 
two different parts of the brain, this is referred to as the dual-code theory (Pavio, 
1977). Baker and Santa found that memory is improved when visual and auditory 
information is used together (1977).  
Apart from mentally ‘visualizing’ an idea, the second type of mental 
representation is the meaning-based representation, which deals with reasoning. 
Johnson-Laird clarified that manipulation of mental images corresponds to visual 
representations where the conceptual process of modifying a mental model 
correspond to reasoning (Johnson-Laird, 1989). A fundamental component of this 
theory is that one can make inferences about unstated relationships (Johnson-
Laird, 1989).  Reasoning is a critical part of human thinking.  Johnson-Laird, 
Girotto and Legrenzi argued that individuals possess countless mental models 
available. They also argued that there are some rules of inferences that are applied 
when reasoning, depending on which mental model is being used (1998). Each 
mental model represents a different possibility (Byrne, 2000). This theory of 
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reasoning was based on deductive reasoning and has been studied and supported 
extensively by many researchers (Byrne, 2000). 
A core assumption for this dissertation study is that knowledge is 
integrated into an organized coherent framework called a mental model and that 
learning occurs when the knowledge structure is modified. 
 
Conceptual Learning within the Domain of Natural Selection 
Mental models are a representation in the mind that consists of a set of 
concepts connected by causal links.  These structures vary from highly 
sophisticated to naïve. They may be constructed from formal education but often 
spontaneously emerge during personal experiences (Schmidt et al., 1989).  When 
learning a new domain-specific concept in the classroom, students come with a 
mental model of the conception. When students are presented with new 
information it will either confirm or contradict their mental model. Conceptual 
change occurs when a learner modifies their knowledge structure to match new 
information. Conceptual change is part of the learning process (Au et al., 2008; 
Garvin-Doxas & Klymkowsky, 2008; Roschelle, 1992; Strike & Posner, 1992; 
Stella Vosniadou, Ioannides, Dimitrakopoulou, & Papademetriou, 2001). 
 
Conceptual Change 
Conceptual change is commonly defined as the restructuring of an existing 
mental model. Different researchers have defined the mechanism by which 
conceptual change occurs. For example, Carey and Smith define it as a process of 
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establishing new conceptual boundaries or collapsing old conceptual boundaries 
(Carey, 2000; Smith, 2007), where Chi defines it as reassigning concepts into a 
different ontological category (Chi, 2005), and Vosniadou and Brewer define it as 
a revision of a framework (Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992).   Many studies document 
conceptual change, usually this involves a transition from a naïve model to a 
normative model. These studies include topics such as the theory of energy as a 
substance-based theory to a process-based theory (Slotta & Chi, 2006); the change 
from a non-spherical model of the earth to a spherical model  (Vosniadou & 
Brewer, 1992); the change from a tactile theory of matter to a particulate theory 
(Smith, 2007); the change from a behavioral theory of illness to a germ-based 
theory (Au et al., 2008; Solomon & Cassimatis, 1999); and the change from a 
directed based theory of evolution to a selection based theory  (Bishop & 
Anderson, 1990; Brumby, 1984; Ferrari & Chi, 1998; Moore et al., 2002). 
 There is a theoretical disagreement found in the research of conceptual 
change. In one camp, researchers have argued that knowledge is comprised of a 
set of coherent theories, similar to scientific theories in their structure and 
function and that conceptual change involves the restructuring of those theories 
(Carey, 2000). In the other camp, researchers have argued that student’s 
knowledge is bettered seen as a collection of fragmented ideas grounded in a 
specific context, better known as “knowledge-in-pieces” (diSessa, 1993). Due to 
recent findings, extreme positions on either side of the debate are no longer held 
because students’ knowledge consistently show a moderate, yet far from perfect, 
amount of coherence (diSessa, Gillespie, & Esterly, 2004). Also, although the 
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“knowledge-in-pieces” view provided an explanation for students inability to 
transfer knowledge in different contexts, it failed to account for the vast body of 
knowledge demonstrating domain-specific development of expertise (Spelke & 
Kinzler, 2007). 
Despite the differences between the two theoretical groups, all researchers 
recognize the significance of misconceptions.  Students enter the science 
classroom with preconceived ideas of science from personal experiences. Some of 
these preconceived ideas are consistent with the science concepts covered in the 
classroom and help in understanding the topic (Clement, 1993). However, 
sometimes the preconceived ideas do not match scientifically accepted theories. 
These are referred to as misconceptions. Some misconceptions hinder learning 
because the normative concept does not fit the mental model of the learner. When 
a student who has not undergone a conceptual change is asked to explain a 
scientific concept, it is explained consistent with their mental model but is not 
necessarily the normative explanation (Au et al., 2008; Vosniadou & Brewer, 
1992). “Correcting” discrepant information varies depending on the robustness of 
the misconception. Many interventions have been designed for the goal to rid 
misconceptions with varying success (Chinn & Brewer, 1993; Shtulman, 2006).  
The process of changing a misconception to a normative conception can 
be classified into three different categories according to their resistance to change 
(Chi, 2008). The first type is the modification of individual beliefs. A false belief 
is when there is a contradiction between prior knowledge and new information. 
Usually, these exist because the learner has not been formally exposed to the 
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normative information in an educational setting. False beliefs are the least 
resistant to change and the straightforward technique of refutation will work well 
in removing this type of misconception (Chi, 2008). The conceptual change 
literature is saturated with lists of false beliefs (Anderson et al., 2002; Brumby, 
1984; Evans, 2000; Geraedts & Boersma, 2006; Hagman, Olander, & Wallin, 
2002; A. E. Lawson & Weser, 1990).  
The second type of conceptual change involves mental model 
transformations (Chi, 2008). As previously described, mental models are a 
representation containing concepts and relationships between those concepts. 
Mental models are used to predict and describe outcomes about the world 
(Johnson-Laird, 1989).   Misconceptions arise due to a flawed mental model that 
is coherent but incorrect. Flawed mental models have been found to be fairly 
resistant to change but with time and exposure to the topic show success in 
changing (Asterhan & Schwarz, 2007; Catley, 2006; Gregg, Winer, Cottrell, 
Hedman, & Fournier, 2001; Jacobson & Archodidou, 2000; Jensen & Finley, 
1996).  
The third and last type of conceptual change involves a categorical shift 
and is the most resistant to change (Chi, 2008). Part of the learning process 
involves assigning a new concept to a mental category. Occasionally, a learner 
will assign a new concept into the wrong mental category. For example, if a child 
is learning about dolphins and puts that concept into the “fish mental category” 
then they will incorrectly attribute all the properties of fish to the concept of 
dolphin. These types of misconceptions are the most robust and resistant to 
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change (Garvin-Doxas & Klymkowsky, 2008; Moore et al., 2002; Shtulman, 
2006). 
Regardless of the type of misconception an individual has, the first step in 
undergoing a conceptual change is recognizing the discrepancy between their 
naïve concept and the normative concept. This confrontation of concepts is called 
cognitive dissonance. In the education literature, cognitive dissonance is viewed 
as a catalyst for learning because it promotes the necessary changes in mental 
models (Chan et al., 1997). Moreover, collaborative settings afford more 
opportunities for cognitive dissonance due to differences in knowledge between 
collaborators (Gijlers & Jong, 2005; D.W. Johnson & Johnson, 1979; Linn, 2006).  
 
Natural Selection 
Misconceptions occur more frequently when learning difficult content-
domains, such as the biological process of Natural Selection. When students have 
naïve conceptions of natural phenomena which deviate from scientific 
explanations, students have difficulty understanding the concept (Brumby, 1984). 
The reason why students have difficulty is because students are unable to relate 
what they already know (prior knowledge) to the new discrepant information. It is 
important that students learn the details of Natural Selection as the mechanism of 
evolution because it is a central concept in biology (Bishop & Anderson, 1990; 
Brumby, 1984; Ferrari & Chi, 1998; Jensen & Finley, 1996; Nehm & Schonfeld, 
2008; Passmore, 2002; Sandoval & Millwood, 2005; Settlage, 1994; Shtulman, 
2006).  Yet, students do not thoroughly understand the theory even after 
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instruction because students are hindered due to misconceptions (Brumby, 1984; 
Settlage, 1994). 
Students who possess a scientifically inaccurate mental representation 
about evolution tend to hold misconceptions about multiple connected concepts. 
From 49 studies that use Natural Selection as the content-domain, robust 
misconceptions can be narrowed down to 7 ideas. The first misconception is that 
individuals with the advantageous variant are the only ones that live and survive 
to reproduce (Garvin-Doxas & Klymkowsky, 2008; Geraedts & Boersma, 2006; 
Jacobson & Archodidou, 2000).  The second common misconception is that 
individuals can make themselves evolve out of necessity (Bishop & Anderson, 
1990; Ferrari & Chi, 1998; Geraedts & Boersma, 2006; Jacobson & Archodidou, 
2000; Jensen & Finley, 1996; Moore et al., 2002; Nehm & Reilly, 2007; Settlage, 
1994; Shtulman, 2006). The third common misconception is that the environment 
causes evolution (Alters & Nelson, 2002; Ferrari & Chi, 1998; Geraedts & 
Boersma, 2006; Jacobson & Archodidou, 2000; Jensen & Finley, 1996; Nehm & 
Reilly, 2007). The fourth common misconception is that traits are acquired by an 
individual during its lifetime are believed to be passed on to the offspring (Bishop 
& Anderson, 1990; Geraedts & Boersma, 2006; Jacobson & Archodidou, 2000; 
Jensen & Finley, 1996; Lawson & Thompson, 1988; Settlage, 1994; Shtulman, 
2006). The fifth common misconception is that the different proportions of 
variants are not accounted for, considering every individual in population to be 
identical and that Natural Selection acts on the population as a whole (Alters & 
Nelson, 2002; Geraedts & Boersma, 2006; Jacobson & Archodidou, 2000; Nehm 
 20 
& Reilly, 2007; Shtulman, 2006). Students think that the trait gradually changes, 
rather than the changing proportion of individuals with discrete traits (Alters & 
Nelson, 2002). The sixth common misconception is that Natural Selection has a 
goal (Ferrari & Chi, 1998; Moore et al., 2002). The seventh and final 
misconception is that the random process of evolution involves traits randomly 
appearing or disappearing (Garvin-Doxas & Klymkowsky, 2008; Geraedts & 
Boersma, 2006; Sandoval & Millwood, 2005). 
A collaborative learning setting can provide students with the opportunity 
to discuss alternative conceptions. Discussing conceptions that differ from one’s 
knowledge is a critical part of the learning process because it may reveal 
individual misconceptions that only become apparent though verbalization 
(Kneser & Ploetzner, 2001; Vahey, Enyedy, & Gifford, 1999). In this dissertation 
research, I explored collaborative learning about the biological process of Natural 
Selection. Theoretically, the collaborative environment induced cognitive 
dissonance among the collaborators, which facilitated conceptual change.  
 
Collaborative Learning 
Collaborative learning, as defined in this dissertation, is the face-to-face 
interaction between two participants in a coordinated effort to learn new material, 
(Roschelle & Teasley, 1994).When students are involved in active and interactive 
instructional strategies, students gain cognitive benefits such as deeper 
comprehension of ideas and an increase retention of concepts (Dolmans & 
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instructional strategies are considered to be student-centered. There are a variety 
of implementations, but most focus on the students’ exploration and application of 
the course material. Interactive strategies differ to traditional strategies, which 
includes the teacher’s presentation or explanation of material (Summers, 
Beretvas, Svinicki, & Gorin, 2005).  
 
Mechanism of Collaboration 
Although there is no theory to explain the collaborative mechanism in 
which students benefit, there are measurable factors involved that have been 
scrutinized. In an attempt to build a theory to explain the mechanism of 
collaboration, I used three categories to evaluate the relationship between 
collaboration and learning. The first category includes the input characteristics. 
This research included prior knowledge, sex and religious background. The 
second category includes the interaction characteristics: activating prior 
knowledge, help seeking, explanation and elaboration. The third category includes 
the output characteristics, or the collaboration benefits. These are the creation of 
new and original knowledge, deeper comprehension of ideas, retention of 
knowledge, transfer, and intrinsic motivation. Although, all three categories are 
discussed in this chapter, the research in this dissertation will focus mainly on the 
three input characteristics: prior knowledge, sex and religious background. 
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Input characteristics 
Prior Knowledge and Collaborative Learning. Prior knowledge is defined 
as the mental model that a learner possesses on a particular topic before learning 
new material. These mental models represent rules and inferences about how 
processes, like Natural Selection work.  These mental models vary from naïve to 
highly sophisticated. They may be constructed from formal education but often 
spontaneously emerge during personal experiences (Schmidt et al., 1989). 
Learning new concepts involves a process where the student integrates the new 
information into their existing mental model. Therefore, prior knowledge always 
plays a role in any learning situation. Learning proceeds primarily from prior 
knowledge and secondarily from the presented materials (Roschelle, 1992; 
Roschelle & Goldman, 1992). The classic study by Bransford and Johnson (1972) 
demonstrated that students with relevant prior knowledge and the activation of it 
promoted learning. Other studies have shown the same effect of prior knowledge 
on learning (Hewson & Hewson, 1983; P. Johnson & Pearson, 1982; McKeown, 
Beck, Sinatra, & Loxterman, 1992; Schmidt et al., 1989; Shapiro, 2004).  
It is common, during the learning process, for prior knowledge of an 
individual to conflict with new material. This is known as cognitive dissonance.  
Cognitive dissonance promotes conceptual change (Strike & Posner, 1992). 
Collaborative learning can facilitate conceptual change because in an interactive 
setting it is more likely that the mental model of an individual will be confronted 
with new ideas due to the differences in the prior knowledge of the individual 
collaborators.  Therefore, different combinations of prior knowledge among 
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individuals in a collaborative setting might lead to different communication and 
elicit conceptual change (Baker, Hansen, Joiner, & Traum, 1999; Fijlers & Jong, 
2005).  
Few studies have measured the differences in prior knowledge of 
collaborators. Research in learning clearly explains that the acquisition of new 
knowledge depends heavily on an individual’s prior knowledge (Bransford & 
Johnson, 1972). If differences exist between the mental models of two 
collaborators, what happens in a collaborative setting? How much do the 
differences in prior knowledge of the collaborators influence the changes in their 
individual mental models? This research aims to answer that question. It is my 
hypothesis that new knowledge is co-constructed during an interactive process 
due to the differences in the mental models of the participants. Therefore, I 
predict that if the mental models are measured before collaboration, the more 
dissimilar they are the bigger the collaborative benefit. Studies about controversy 
and heterogeneous groups support this prediction.  
Controversy during collaboration leads to highly constructive or highly 
destructive outcomes (Johnson & Johnson, 1979; Schultz-Hardt et al., 2002). 
Johnson and Johnson (1979) found that managed-controversy in collaborative 
settings led to increased cognitive development and learning. By controlling the 
controversy in group collaboration they argued that the conflict promoted 
cognitive dissonance, which in turn encouraged modification of mental models 
(Johnson & Johnson, 1979). Also, argumentation (a form of controversy) in 
collaborative settings has a tendency to have a similar cognitive impact. By 
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definition, argumentation refers to the process of justifying claims and 
explanations (Sampson & Clark, 2008). In a sense, argumentation deals with 
arguing about differences in interpretations, allowing the participants to build on 
each other’s knowledge as well as recognizing and resolving contradictions 
between their own and other students’ knowledge (Azmitia, 1988). 
Several researchers have studied heterogeneity of groups. Because 
heterogeneous groups often result in controversy and argumentation they are 
superior to homogenous groups in terms of quality of group solution, creativity of 
group solution and member satisfaction with the solution (Amaria, Biran, & Leith 
1969; Jackson et al., 1991; Paul, Seetharaman, Samarah, & Mykytyn, 2004; 
Schultz-Hardt, Jochims, & Frey, 2002). 
An example of success from heterogeneous collaboration is illustrated in a 
study by Schultz-Hardt (2002). Approximately 200 employees were put into 
groups of three. Each participant was asked to read an economic case study about 
a chemical company wanting to expand to either country A or country B. The 
participants were then allowed to request additional information about either 
country or both. Based on the requested information, individuals were put into 
groups designated as homogenous or heterogeneous. The groups were given time 
to collaborate and request further information if needed. The results suggest that 
there was more information seeking during the collaboration for the 
heterogeneous groups compared to the homogeneous groups which explained 
why the heterogeneous groups came up with the best solution, on average, 
compared to the homogeneous groups (Schultz-Hardt, Jochims, & Frey, 2002). 
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This result could be explained by the pooling of different mental models 
(accessible only to individual members of the group).  
In an attempt to explain why collaborative learning is more beneficial than 
individual learning and more specifically, why heterogeneous groups outperform 
homogenous groups I will measure the mental models of individuals prior to 
learning about the biological process of Natural Selection collaboratively in 
dyads. I will examine if having dissimilar prior knowledge about the content will 
affect learning. I will be looking at both individual learning and group 
collaborative problem solving. From this experiment, I predict that dissimilar 
prior knowledge between collaborators will result in high quality collaboration 
and an increase in learning. 
 
Sex and Collaborative Learning. Individual characteristics can affect the 
way a collaborative group succeeds or fails. This applies to sex differences. One 
reason for this gender-effect is differences in interaction styles for males and 
females during collaboration (Margrett & Marsiske, 2002). At an early age, males 
and females interact differently in a social setting based on gender-specific 
behaviors, such as duration and frequency. These behaviors can impact the 
outcome of a collaboration (Maccoby, 1990). It is not surprising that sex 
differences effect collaboration, because a great deal of research has shown 
differences in communication between males verses females (Carli, 1989; Leaper 
& Ayres, 2007). Leaper and Smith (2004) did a meta-analysis on gender 
variations in language use. They confirmed that individuals display gender 
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differences in conversation style. Girls use more allied speech, where boys use 
more assertive speech. These differences are seen early in young children. Leman, 
Ahmed and Ozarow (2005) examined the relationship between sex and children’s 
communication styles in the context of a classroom problem-solving task. The 
students were given different shapes (circle, triangle and square) and were told 
that each shape was worth a different value (for example 10, 20 and 50). The 
students were asked to work with a partner and add shapes together so that they 
total 100 points. Unknown to both, each student had been told the wrong 
information about the values associated with the different shapes. This conflict led 
to a discussion between the students to agree upon a solution. As expected by the 
researchers, gender-specific communication was seen. Specifically, boys 
displayed more assertive talk compared to girls. The most notable difference was 
that boys had a higher frequency of interrupting a girl compared to girls 
interrupting boys (Leman, Ahmed, & Ozarow, 2005). 
What sex composition is optimal for the individual collaborators and the 
group as a whole? According to Maccoby, (1990) women are at a disadvantage in 
an interactive setting because she found that women display same-gender 
behavior characteristics in a mixed-sex group and males are unresponsive to those 
behaviors. In addition, men are more likely to take a leadership position in a 
collaborative setting compared to women which tends to underutilize input from 
the female group members (Kolb, 1997).  This is overwhelmingly evident in 
studies involving females in a predominantly male field (Baker, Krause, Yasar, 
Roberts, & Robinson Kurpius, 2007; She, 1999; Southerland, Kittleson, Settlage, 
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& Lanier, 2005). For example, Baker demonstrated in a collaborative study 
involving graduate level electrical engineering students, that women were 
marginalized during teamwork activities (Baker et al., 2007).  
However, other studies claim the contrary: women are at an advantage in a 
collaborative setting. For example, a study by Woolley found a significant 
correlation between the numbers of females in a group to the collective 
intelligence (c) of the group. They attributed their finding to social sensitivity, a 
trait where females scored higher compared to males (Woolley et al., 2010). In 
Woolley’s study, the groups were asked to perform a series of tasks such as 
puzzle solving, brainstorming, and making collective moral judgments, and the 
groups (composed of 2-5 members) containing a majority of females significantly 
outperformed groups contain a majority of males.   
Does group composition based on same-sex versus mixed-sex play a role 
on the success of individual collaborators or the group as a whole? Science 
education research suggests that it does (Tucker et al., 1995).  A study by Barbieri 
and Light (1992) found that males tended to be more dominant in same-sex dyads, 
where females in the same-sex dyads demonstrated more turn taking. Lee and 
Marks claim that “females benefit more from same-gender learning 
environments” (Corston & Colman, 1996; Lee & Marks, 1990). In a review on 
sex differences on group performance, Wood concluded that the type of 
collaborative task determines who will be at an advantage (Wood, 1987).  For 
instance, interaction styles of women appeared to drive tasks that involve social 
activity and group consensus, where men appeared to drive tasks that require a 
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correct solution (Wood, 1987). Variations in the effects of sex in different 
contexts are profoundly relevant in a collaborative setting (Leman, 2010).  
However, it would be minimalistic to view gender-specific communication styles 
as universal, or that one sex will inevitable succeed compared to the other. A 
theory called contextual interactive model suggests that gender communication 
differences are at their greatest when a common goal is not shared between the 
collaborators. In other words, there is less differentiation seen when two 
individuals are connected with a shared goal or conversation focus (Deaux & 
Major, 1983).  
This dissertation research aims at exploring the relationship between sex-
differences and learning in a collaborative setting. Learning is defined as a 
difference in scores on an individual assessment and a group assessment. In an 
attempt to examine this relationship I analyzed collaborative groups with different 
compositions based on sex. I measured any observable learning difference 
between males and females along with group performance based on group 
composition. It was predicted that there would be a difference in learning through 
collaboration. Furthermore, I hypothesized that groups composed of females 
would result in a more effective collaboration at the group level and that females 
would have an increase in learning compared to their male counterparts. 
 
Religious Beliefs and Collaborative Learning. The majority of college 
students do not understand evolutionary theory (Lawson & Thompson, 1988). 
Most studies claim that misconceptions arise due to the complexity of the topic 
 29 
and that it is the misconceptions that prevent students from fully understanding 
the theory (Demastes, Settlage, & Good, 1995; Geraedts & Boersma, 2006; 
Hagman, Olander, & Wallin, 2002; Jacobson & Archodidou, 2000). The research 
clearly demonstrates that understanding the biological process of evolution 
requires more than a few lessons in biology. It also requires lessons in the nature 
of science and the philosophy in science. In other words, an individual first has to 
understand what constitutes a scientific theory before they can appreciate and 
comprehend the concept of evolutionary theory (Dagher & BouJaoude, 1997; 
Lombrozo, Shtulman, & Weisberg, 2006; Lombrozo, Thanukos, & Weisberg, 
2008). 
Some researchers claim that if a student understands the nature of science 
then they are more likely to accept the theory of evolution, despite contradictory 
religious beliefs (Dagher & BouJaoude, 1997). Overall, few studies have looked 
at the relationship between understanding evolutionary theory and believing it to 
be true.  
Some people accept evolutionary theory to various degrees where others 
reject it. Environmental influences might play a role in the acceptance of 
evolution, as suggested by Brem, Ranney, and Schindel (2003). She found that 
students who accept evolutionary theory were exposed to antievolution messages 
as often as creationists, however students who accept evolutionary theory were 
exposed to pro-evolution messages more than creationists. Also, students who 
accept evolutionary theory were more likely to believe that evolution had no 
social consequences compared to students who didn’t accept evolutionary theory 
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(Brem, Ranney, & Schinel, 2003). What effect does the acceptance or rejection of 
evolution have on learning complex content pertaining to the process of Natural 
Selection? A more interesting question that has yet to be examined is: Do the 
differences or similarities in religious beliefs of the collaborators have an effect 
on learning, in a collaborative setting. It is the goal of this dissertation research to 
analyze the effects of group composition based on religious beliefs on learning 
about the biological process of Natural Selection. 
 
Interaction characteristics 
Collaboration, as a learning process, can also be examined by observing 
interaction characteristics. These characteristics involve observable traits that play 
out during a discussion between collaborators. The first characteristic is the 
activation of prior knowledge. The kind of prior knowledge a learner possesses 
greatly influences their ability to learn new information. But having the right prior 
knowledge isn’t enough; it must be evoked for learning to occur. Schmidt (1989) 
illustrated this in a study where participants in an experimental group studied a 
content-relevant text before collaborating on a problem. During the collaboration, 
the participants in the experimental group that discussed the information in the 
text (activating prior knowledge) outperformed students in the control group. In a 
more recent study by Barron (2000), she demonstrated the importance of the 
activation of prior knowledge. She qualitatively observed small groups to 
determine which factors were more associated with effective collaborative 
problem solving. The characteristics she looked at were conversation length, the 
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induction of prior knowledge and the number of ideas that were not related to the 
problem. She reported that the induction of prior knowledge was the only factor 
that was directly correlated to individual performance on a post test (Barron, 
2000).  
The second interactive characteristic involved in collaboration is giving 
and receiving help. Help seeking behaviors have a positive relationship to 
learning (Webb & Mastergeorge, 2003). These are exploration behaviors where 
the learner has the opportunity to discover new information. However, just 
participating in these types of behaviors doesn’t guarantee that learning will 
occur. For example, just seeking and hearing an explanation does not correlate 
with learning, as demonstrated in the tutor research. Roscoe and Chi (2007) 
observed that tutors spend the majority of a tutoring session explaining concepts 
to a tutee. This behavior does not correlate to the tutee learning. Despite this, 
Vedder (1985) proposed that help seeking behaviors are only effective if the 
student uses the new information. For example, effective help seeking behavior 
could include a student practicing solving a problem using someone else’s 
explanation. This allows the participant to make and reveal mistakes while 
attempting to solve a problem. Webb & Mastergeorge (2003) analyzed the 
behaviors of individuals seeking and receiving help. They found that students that 
used the help to practice solving a problem had higher scores compared to 
students just saying “I get it” (Webb & Mastergeorge, 2003). Both the giver and 
receiver of help should be in a position to benefit because receiving help is an act 
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of exploration and giving help allows a participant to explain and elaborate (Webb 
& Mastergeorge, 2003). 
Explanation is the third collaborative characteristic that has been shown to 
be productive in the learning process. Explanations are statements that articulate 
information with the goal of making some idea clear and comprehensible (Roscoe 
& Chi, 2007). During collaborative learning, participants use verbal explanations 
to express key ideas, principles and relationships (Slavin, 1996). These 
explanations may involve a range of elements such as summarizing main ideas, 
using examples, and using analogies. They can be used to share known 
information or to make sense of new information (Chi et al., 1989; Roscoe & Chi, 
2007). Collaboration affords a setting for explanation. Explaining allows the 
learner to actively construct and modify mental models, which facilitate the 
processing and understanding of new information (Dolmans & Schmidt, 1996; 
Mayer, 1984; Webb, 1989). During collaborative learning, the explanations used 
can be embedded into scaffolding interactions, where the participants interact 
over successive turns to incrementally develop the knowledge of each other. 
Furthermore, when explaining while solving a problem collaboratively students 
are forced to think about the salient features of a problem, which is essential for 
developing problem-solving strategies (Cooper, 1999). 
Elaboration is the fourth collaborative characteristic. Elaboration can take 
different forms, which include discussion, note-taking or answering questions. 
These activities help the learners to reflect on what he or she understands but it 
also helps to construct rich cognitive models about the information that is being 
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learned (Schmidt, 1993). From a cognitive perspective, elaboration is thought of 
as a form of higher-order thinking in which new ideas are generated by 
connecting new information with knowledge already present (Blankenstein et al., 
2009). The act of elaborating encourages the learner to recognize misconceptions 
and reorganized mental models (King, 1994). Not surprisingly, the richness of 
elaboration has led many to hypothesize that it contributes towards learning 
(Bargh & Schul, 1980; King, 1994) 
 
Output characteristics 
Collaboration is often utilized as a learning strategy in science classrooms. 
The collaboration output characteristics can be defined as the benefits of this 
learning strategy. The output characteristics include: deeper comprehension of 
ideas, transfer, retention of knowledge, and the creation of new and original 
knowledge (Doymus, 2008; Ebert-May, Brewer, & Allred, 1997; Fischer & 
Mandl, 2005; Jensen & Finley, 1996; Mastropieri, Scruggs, & Graetz, 2003; 
Peters & Armstrong, 1998; Roschelle & Teasley, 1994; Stahl, 2000).  
First, deeper comprehension of concepts and retention of knowledge is a 
common result of collaborative learning. Ebert-May (1997) compared the 
biological literary outcome of a class that used cooperative groups to a class that 
used a traditional lecture format.  The hypothesis of the study was that “students 
would learn science better by becoming engaged in the process of science” 
(Ebert-May, Brewer & Allred, 1997, pg. 602). Concept maps were given to the 
experimental group showing the relationships between ideas, to provide a visual 
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road map. Following this, students were asked to work on three problems in small 
groups. When comparing learning gains from a pre and post-tests, the 
collaborative opportunity in the experimental class provided students with the 
chance to learn and retain more of the science content when compared to the 
students in the traditional lecture format (Ebert-May, Brewer & Allred, 1997).  
In addition to deeper comprehension and retention of knowledge, 
collaborative learning has been successful at promoting transfer of new 
knowledge.   Tans, Schmidt, Schade-Hoogevenn, and Gijselaers (1986) did a 
study on medical students where they randomly assigned each participant to either 
a problem-based or a lecture-based version of a course in muscle physiology.  He 
used a test of core knowledge to measure learning and a test with real world 
problems to measure transfer. These assessments were given after six months of 
taking the course. Students from the problem-based group scored up to five times 
higher on both tests compared to the control group (Tans et al., 1986). 
Thirdly, the co-construction of knowledge can be determined as an output 
trait of collaborative learning. New and original knowledge isn’t simply the sum 
of the individual knowledge from the individual collaborators. It is both more 
than and different than the individual knowledge parts (Peters & Armstrong, 
1998). “The group learning experience is more than the sum of individual 
experiences because of the interactive nature of the knowledge construction 
process” (Peters & Armstrong, 1998). Webb and Palinscar (1996) examined four 
collaborative factors. The four factors were: resolution of conflict and 
controversy, giving and receiving explanations, providing emotional and 
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motivational support and the co-construction of new ideas. Of the four measures, 
co-construction had the highest correlation to learning (Webb & Palinscar, 1996). 
In other words, an effective collaboration has to involve creating new and original 
knowledge that did not exist in any of the individuals before the collaboration. In 
sum, collaboration means that people work together in order to construct 
something that did not exist before the collaboration, something that does not and 
cannot fully exist in the lives of individual collaborators (Peters & Armstrong, 
1998; Stahl & Hesse, 2009).  
 In this chapter, I discussed the research and theoretical frameworks 
of collaboration and the relationship of collaboration to student learning. In the 
education literature, when collaborative groups are compared to individual 
learning, the participants in the collaborative groups often outperform their 
individual counterparts (Dolmans & Schmidt, 1996). This result is not surprising 
considering the collaboration benefits that individuals gain from learning 
interactively (Dolmans & Schmidt, 1996). The benefits include deeper 
comprehension of ideas, retention of knowledge, transfer and the creation of new 
and original knowledge (Doymus, 2008; Diane Ebert-May et al., 1997; Fischer & 
Mandl, 2005; Jensen & Finley, 1996; Mastropieri et al., 2003; Peters & 
Armstrong, 1998; Roschelle & Teasley, 1994; Stahl, 2000). Collaborative 
learning activities are frequently used in science classrooms. However, 
knowledge about how to group students for optimal learning is still an emerging 
area of research. As always, there is a need to understand the mechanism behind 
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collaborative learning to utilize it in terms of grouping students for effective 
collaboration.  
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODS 
 
This research involved analyzing collaborative learning about the 
biological process of Natural Selection. Numerous studies in science education 
make a case that students who participate in collaborative learning generally 
outperform students who learn alone (Doymus, 2008; Ebert-May, Brewer, & 
Allred., 1997 ; Fischer & Mandl, 2005; Jensen & Finley, 1996; Roschelle & 
Teasley, 1994; Stahl, 2000). This dissertation had two aims; the first aim was to 
design a sensitive tool to measure learning. Learning was defined as the 
difference between test scores. The second aim was to measure the effects of three 
factors on learning in a collaborative setting.  I first validated that a high quality 
collaborative-learning session resulted in learning then analyzed the three factors. 
The first factor was prior knowledge similarity (similar or dissimilar) between 
collaborators. The second factor was sex, male or female. The third factor was 
religious belief with regard to human evolution. There were three categories: 
creationist, evolutionist or a blend. Students who believe that human beings have 
developed over millions of years from less advanced forms of life without the 
help of God’s guidance were categorized as evolutionists.  Students who believe 
that God created human beings in their present form were categorized as 
creationists and students that believe that human beings developed over millions 
of years from less advanced forms of life, but God guided this process were 
categorized as blend. Three dependent variables were used to measure learning at 
two levels. The two levels were the individual level and the group level. The 
learning gains at the individual level were calculated from two assessments: the 
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CINS developed by Anderson (2002) and a Mental Model Task developed by me. 
To measure at the group level, each dyad was asked to complete a problem-
solving task collaboratively.  
Chapter three presents a description of the research design and methods 
selected for this study, including details of the sample, a description of the 
materials used and the procedure of the data collection. All data sources are 
detailed in the appendix (Appendix D-J). Finally, I will explain how the data was 
analyzed to answer the following research questions. 
 
Research Questions 
1. Does the quality of collaboration have an effect on learning concepts 
about Natural Selection at the individual level and/or at the group level? 
2. In a collaborative setting, does the difference in prior knowledge increase 
learning concepts about Natural Selection at the individual level and/or at 
the group level? 
3. In a collaborative setting, does sex have an effect on learning concepts 
about Natural Selection at the individual level and/or at the group level? 
4. In a collaborative setting, do religious beliefs have an effect on learning 
concepts about Natural Selection at the individual level and/or at the group 
level? 
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Research Design and Sample Description 
Description of Research Design 
This research was designed to achieve two goals: 1) to design a reliable 
and valid instrument to measure learning in the domain of evolution and 2) to 
investigate the quality of collaboration and the effect of three collaborative factors 
on learning about the biological process of Natural Selection. The three factors 
were prior knowledge similarity, sex, and religious beliefs.  The study design was 
quantitative. The design of the Mental Model Task utilized a Pearson correlation 
model; analyzing the effects of collaborative factors utilized a Univariate Analysis 
of Covariance (ANCOVA) model. I performed four ANCOVAs for each of the 
following factors: quality of collaboration with two levels (effective or 
ineffective), prior knowledge similarity with two levels (similar or dissimilar), sex 
with two levels (male or female) and religious beliefs with three levels 
(creationist, evolutionist, blend).  
 
Procedure 
 
The study took place on three separate days in seven different classrooms 
(Appendix A). I conducted the study (IRB #1010005648). 
 
Day 1. Students were introduced to the study and informed that the purpose of the 
study is to investigate the mechanism of collaborative learning in a scientific 
domain. As an incentive to participate, all students who agreed to participate and 
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completed all three days were entered in a drawing for a $50 American Express 
gift card, which was issued to one student at the end of the semester. If consented, 
each participant was assigned a number and was informed that they would never 
be identified as a participant in the study (Appendix B). Each participant 
individually completed a demographic survey (Appendix D), followed by taking 
the CINS pre-test (Appendix F), and lastly, they completed the Mental Model 
Task (Appendix E). This took approximately one hour. 
 
Day 2. Participants, individually, read the text materials on Natural Section 
(Appendix C) and then completed the Mental Model Task.  This took 
approximately one hour. The data from the Mental Model Task was used to assign 
dyads into two groups: similar mental models and dissimilar mental models. At 
the end of Day 2, I met with each instructor to explain how to observe the 
collaborations and went over the instructions and the observation sheet (Appendix 
E). The meeting with each instructor ranged from 20 min to 45 min. 
 
Day 3. Participants were put into their assigned dyads and worked on the 
collaborative problem-solving task where each dyad solved three problems 
(Appendix H). Two problems were near transfer problems and the third was a far 
transfer problem. The researcher and the instructor wrote down observations for 
each dyad while the participants collaborated. After collaborating, each individual 
completed an evaluation on the collaboration (Appendix J), the CINS posttest and 
the Mental Model Task. This took between 1 and 1.5 hours. After the participants 
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left the room, the instructor and I discussed each collaborative dyad and compared 
notes to come to a consensus about the quality of each dyad. This meeting lasted 
between 20 to 30 min for the community college classes because of the smaller 
number of dyads (7-10 dyads) and approximately 45 min for the ASU class, 
which had 22 dyads.  
 
Sample 
The study was conducted in Phoenix, Arizona with a convenience sample 
of 142 students who were enrolled at either GateWay Community College or 
Arizona State University. Participants were recruited from the following four 
classes at GateWay Community College: BIO205 Microbiology, BIO105 
Environmental Biology, BIO156 Introductory Biology for Allied Health or 
BIO202 Human Anatomy and Physiology II, and one class at Arizona State 
University: BIO440 Functional Genomics. The sample of students was comprised 
of 53 males and 89 females across a range of ages (18-63) and ethnic groups 
(Table 3.1). There was a large range in biological knowledge of the participants 
due to the diversity of the classes from which participants were recruited. The 
majority of the students had been exposed to some Natural Selection concepts 
prior to the study.  
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TABLE 3.1: Student Demographics  
Factor Level n 
Sex   
 Male 53 
 Female 89 
Ethnicity   
 Caucasian 74 
 Latino 35 
 African American 20 
 Asian 9 
  Native American 4 
 
 
Sample size determination.  A power analysis was performed to determine 
what sample size was required to have a reasonable chance of detecting a 
difference when a true difference existed. The power analysis suggested a 
minimum sample of 33 dyads in each group.  This a-priori sample size 
calculation was derived using the alpha level of .05, one predictor, the anticipated 
effect size of .7 and the desired statistical power level of .80 (Nakagawa & 
Cuthill, 2007). Data was collected on three separate days. There were 205 
students enrolled in the study on Day 1, however 53 participants failed to 
complete all the requirements. Ultimately, there were complete data sets for 142 
participants (71 dyads) that were used in the final analysis. 
 
Materials and Data Sources 
Natural Selection Text 
The Natural Selection text (Appendix C) was prepared to summarize the 
four main principles presented in the theory of evolution through natural selection 
and to provide a well-studied example that applies the tenets of the theory to 
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explain a living population.  I collaborated with two biologists to identify the four 
basic principles in the biological process of natural selection and to choose a text 
based on these principles. The principles are presented in Table 3.2. 
 
 TABLE 3.2: The four principles of Natural Selection  
1. Variation Within a species, individuals show considerable variation in their 
physical characteristics. The variations are produced randomly. 
Only inherited variations are important in evolution. 
 
2. 
Hereditary 
transmissio
n of 
variation 
 
The surviving and successfully reproducing individuals will give 
rise to the next generation, and in this way the “successful” 
variations are transmitted to the next generation. 
3. Struggle 
for survival 
Since a larger number of individuals are born than can survive, 
there is a struggle for survival, a competition for food and space, 
or a struggle to survive unfavorable environmental conditions. 
 
4. Selective 
advantage 
Those organisms with variations that better equip them to survive 
in a given environment will be favored over other organisms that 
are less well adapted. 
 
There were five data sources used to provide the data for this study and all 
participants completed the same activities. The data sources are described below. 
 
Demographic Survey 
The first data source was a demographic survey (Appendix D) created by 
the researcher to identify the participant’s age, sex, major, ethnic group, amount 
of prior exposure to biology content and religious beliefs regarding human 
evolution. This data source was used to collect demographic information as well 
as group dyads into groups based on sex and religious beliefs. 
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Mental Model Task 
The second data source was the Mental Model Task (Appendix E), which 
was used to elicit and capture the mental models of the participants. This 
technique is similar to the grouping task done in a study by Boekaert (2002). The 
information captured from this tool served two purposes. First, it was used to 
measure learning by comparing the participant model to an expert model on each 
day of the procedure. Second, it was used to determine domain-specific prior 
knowledge of the participants before undergoing the collaborative activity for the 
purpose of grouping participants into two groups: similar dyads and dissimilar 
dyads. The expert mental model in the domain of Natural Selection was 
established with the help of an evolutionary biologist from Arizona State 
University, Dr. Michael Rosenberg, to determine the list of 22 terms and the 
appropriate relationship between the terms. To elicit the mental models of the 
participants, they were given a list of pairs where each pair represents a different 
combination of two terms from the total 22 terms (231 pairs). Individually, each 
participant was asked to circle each pair in which the two terms have a 
relationship. From this, a 22x22 matrix was created and a ‘1’ was placed in the 
cell corresponding to each circled pair. Correlation between two matrices was 
computed to the expert to measure learning and to one another to group dyads into 
similar and dissimilar dyads. I was able to measure the degree of similarity within 
domain-specific prior knowledge between collaborators. It allowed me to group 
participants according to the p-values into the two groups: dyads with similar 
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mental models were significantly correlated (p < 0.05) and dyads with dissimilar 
mental models were not significantly correlated (p > 0.05). Correlation was 
calculated using the Mantel Test (Mantel, 1967), which is a statistical test to 
determine the correlation between two matrices.  
 
Validity and Reliability of the Mental Model Task 
Content validity of any instrument refers to the ability of that instrument to 
measure what it is intended to measure, where the reliability of any instrument 
refers to the sensitivity of the instrument to be able to measure the content 
consistently. The Mental Model Task was designed to represent the domain-
specific knowledge structure (or mental model) for each participant with regard to 
Natural Selection. To test for validity, three individuals with varying knowledge 
about natural selection (a nonscientist, a novice and an expert) performed the 
Mental Model Task. Compared to the previously established expert model, the 
results showed that the nonscientist had the lowest correlation (r = 0.015, p = 
0.38), the novice had a correlation between the non-scientist and the expert (r = 
0.251, 0.00) and the expert had the highest correlation (r = 0.669, p = 0.00)(Table 
3.3). These results validate the instrument.   
TABLE 3.3: Calculated Correlation of Mental Model Task for three individuals 
with varying knowledge about natural selection (a nonscientist, a novice and an 
expert) to determine the validity of the Mental Model Task 
    Correlation (r)  p-value 
Non-
scientist High-school Spanish teacher 0.015 0.38872 
Novice High-school biology teacher 0.251 0.00105 
Expert 
University evolutionary biology 
graduate student 0.669 0.00088 
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To test for reliability, a stability test was performed using data from a pilot 
study in a Spring 2011 Microbiology BIO205 class at GateWay Community 
College. Students (n = 18) were asked to do the Mental Model Task at two 
different time points one week apart. Using the Mantel Test to measure 
correlation (r), 8 of the 18 had an r > 0.80, where 9 of the 18 had an r = 1.0 (Table 
3.4). In addition, a Cronbach’s alpha test was performed on my sample. The 
Mental Model Task was found to be reliable (231 items;  = .86). 
 
TABLE 3.4: Calculated Correlation of Mental Model Task for each participant 
when taken at two time points to determine the reliability of the Mental Model 
Task 
 
Week 1 Week2 Correlation (r)  
11101-1  11101-2  1 
111010-1  111010-2  1 
111011-1  111011-2  0.97014 
111012-1  111012-2  1 
111013-1  111013-2  0.88649 
111014-1  111014-2  1 
111015-1  111015-2  1 
111016-1  111016-2  1 
111017-1  111017-2  0.96334 
111018-1  111018-2  1 
11102-1  11102-2  0.96969 
11103-1  11103-2  1 
11104-1  11104-2  0.94192 
11105-1  11105-2  0.97507 
11106-1  11106-2  1 
11107-1  11107-2  0.95928 
11108-1  11108-2  0.98687 
11109-1  11109-2  0.83633 
 
Natural Selection Assessment 
The third data source was the Conceptual Inventory of Natural Selection 
(CINS) developed by Anderson, Fisher and Norman (2002) (D. L. Anderson et 
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al., 2002)(Appendix F). It is a diagnostic test to assess student’s understanding of 
Natural Selection. The items on the test were developed based on actual scientific 
studies of natural selection opposed to using imaginary examples, giving the test 
authenticity. It is a 20-item multiple-choice test that uses common misconceptions 
as distracters. The CINS assesses the following 10 main ideas: biotic potential, 
carrying capacity, resources are limited, limited survival, genetic variation, origin 
of variation, variation is inherited, differential survival, change in population and 
origin of species. In addition to assessing these ideas, the following topics appear 
in the test: competition, randomness, beneficial traits, neutral traits, harmful traits, 
fitness, reproductive success, descent with modification, evolution, change in 
gene pool over time, population, adaptation and species. The CINS was used as 
both the pre- and post-test taken on Day 1 and Day 3 to measure learning. 
 
Validity and Reliability of the Natural Selection Assessment 
The current version of the CINS has been used in multiple studies (Dagher 
& BouJaoude, 2005; Ingram & Nelson, 2005; Kelemen & Rosset, 2009; 
Klymkowsky, Garvin-Doxas, & Zeilik, 2003; Knight & Wood, 2005; Nehm & 
Reilly, 2007). The CINS was the most common assessment used for studies that 
used Natural Selection as the subject domain. For this reason, I chose it for my 
dissertation research. When the CINS was developed, it was field-tested with 206 
students in a nonmajors’ general biology course (Anderson, Fisher & Norman, 
2002). To determine the validity for each item on the CINS, 2 university and 2 
community college biology professors were asked to choose the correct answers 
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for each question. By choosing the intended answer on each question, the test was 
validated. The reliability of a test measures the consistency of responses. To 
ensure the general internal consistency, they used the Kuder-Richardson 20 
(KR20). This method considers all possible ways of splitting the test. The KR20 for 
the test was 0.58 for Section A and 0.64 for section B (Anderson, Fisher & 
Norman, 2002). This reliability is low by most standards. However, when I ran a 
Cronbach’s alpha reliability test on my sample it was higher (20 items;  = .78).  
 
Quality of Collaborations 
The fourth data source was the determination of the quality for each 
collaborative dyad. Each dyad was assessed and placed into two groups: effective 
collaborators or ineffective collaborators. The criteria for effective collaborations 
were established a-priori. Three criteria were used to determine the effectiveness 
for each collaborative dyad to triangulate the observations. Effective collaborators 
required all three of the following criteria. First, the amount of collaboration time, 
for a dyad to qualify to be effective collaborators the collaboration needed to be a 
minimum of 20 minutes (Coleman et al., 1997). Second, both participants in each 
dyad answered an evaluation survey regarding the quality of the collaboration 
(Appendix J). In the survey, it asked if both collaborators contributed equally 
regarding time and content. The participants in each dyad must have determined 
that both collaborators contributed equally to be considered an effective 
collaboration. Third, both the instructor and the researcher observed the 
collaborations as they took place. Careful  notes were taken to capture the 
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presence of two external criteria: equal contribution from both participants and 
presence of collaboration discourse (Appendix G). Both external observations 
needed to be present to meet the third criteria.  
 On Day 1, each instructor was given written instructions on how to 
observe the dyads (Appendix G). On Day 2, each instructor met with the 
researcher independently for a face-to-face explanation on how to observe and 
score students.  This meeting ranged between 20 to 45 min for the three 
instructors. The intention of this meeting was to go over the observation criteria 
and to address any questions the instructors had. The first observation criterion 
was equal contribution during collaboration. This was based on reciprocity, in 
other words, if students conversed back and forth regarding the content (Woolley 
et al., 2010). The second observation criterion was the presence of effective 
collaboration discourse. Collaboration discourse included acknowledgements, 
repetitions or restatements (Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986).  Discourse that 
reflected collaborative skill show that participants acknowledge the other partners 
contributions and maintain attention to the task. This was broken down to three 
types of utterances that could be observed. The utterances were 
acknowledgements (“ok” or “yeah” responses), repetitions (repeating back the 
previous statement), and restatements (rephrasing the previous statement). Each 
of these type of utterances has been shown to positively influence collaboration 
by “establishing the common ground necessary to achieve joint goals” (Clark & 
Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986, pg.). See Table 3.5 for example statements indicative of each 
type of collaborative discourse. Immediately after collaborations were completed, 
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the instructor and researcher went through each dyad to confer observations. All 
discrepancies were resolved in a face-to-face discussion and observations were 
revised accordingly.  
 
TABLE 3.5: Examples of Statements for Collaborative Discourse 
Collaborative Discourse Example 
Acknowledgements 
 
 
 
BergA 
Dyad 2 
 
 
They could be camouflaged in 
the snow. 
Mm-hmm 
 
 
Repetitions 
 
 
 
JTouchman 
Dyad 2 
 
 
Wings are a valuable trait. 
Yeah, wings are valuable. 
 
 
 
Restatements 
 
 
 
JTouchman 
Dyad18 
 
 
Brown or black bears are at a 
disadvantage because of the 
environment.  
Yes, because they don't 
blend into the snow. 
 
Overall, the following three criteria needed to be met for a dyad to be 
placed into the “effective collaboration” group: 1) at least 20 minutes of 
collaboration; 2) both collaborators agree on equal contribution in time and 
content and 3) equal contribution and presence of collaboration discourse 
observed by the instructor and researcher.  
 
Collaborative Problem Solving Task 
The fifth data source was a collaborative task that consisted of three 
problems. This problem-solving task was used to measure learning by 
determining whether students were able to transfer their understanding of the 
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general concepts of the biological process of Natural Selection to unfamiliar 
scenarios (Appendix H). The three questions for this task came from a study by 
Coleman, Brown and Rivkin (1997). The questions differ in their difficulty level 
and the extent in which inferences are required to solve them. The first two 
problems were designed to be near transfer tasks. The first question asks 
participants to use the Theory of Natural Selection to explain how polar bears 
came to be white. Structurally, this problem is very similar to the example that 
was used in the text given on Day 2. The second problem is slightly more difficult 
because it requires the participants to switch from one subject matter to another. 
Instead of thinking about animals evolving visible characteristics, they had to 
switch domains to bacteria evolving greater resistance to antibiotics. To solve 
both of the near transfer problems, participants had to identify an environmental 
pressure, indicate a selective advantage, and refer to the transmission of heredity. 
The explanations were scored for the presence of the following four major 
principles: 1) random variation, 2) struggle for survival, 3) selective advantage 
and 4) hereditary transmission of variation (Coleman, Brown and Rivkin, 1997). 
For scoring the two near-transfer problem solutions, all four principles needed to 
be present.  For each principle, a 0 was given if the principle was not mentioned, a 
score of 1 was given if the principle was alluded to and a score of 2 was given if 
the principle was mentioned clearly. For each near-transfer solution, the total 
score will range from 0 to 8 (see Appendix I for rubric). 
The third problem was a far transfer task because it required the 
participants to infer and apply the four principles presented in the text to a novel 
 52 
task. Participants were asked to explain why evolutionary biologists would be 
concerned about how birds could have developed wings and about what could 
have been the value of earlier intermediate structures (i.e. stubs). To solve this 
problem, participants had to first recognize the existence of the conundrum. The 
conundrum being that it is very difficult to explain how birds developed wings 
solely through concepts of selective advantage and natural selection, because 
having a partial wing (or a stub) does not show an obvious advantage. To be 
successful on this problem, they needed to infer some advantage of an 
intermediate structure. Scoring this problem used a separate coding scheme. 
Using the rating scale developed by Coleman, each solution was scored between 0 
and 3. A score of 0 was given if the participant did not know the answer or if 
there was no mention of any idea. A score of 1 was given if the solution contained 
a reference to the necessity, purpose or usefulness of birds having wings, or if it 
included the impact of the environment in relation to a wing-like structure. A 
score of 2 was given if the solution contained a reference to the wing-like 
structures having a selective advantage but no mention of the conundrum and a 
score of 3 was given if the solution identified the conundrum and gave a possible 
advantage to the intermediate structure (Appendix I). From this collaborative task, 
a total of 19 points were possible. The collaborative solutions were scored by the 
researcher and a biology professor and the average of the two scores were used. 
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Validity and Reliability of the Problem Solving Task 
Content validity for this instrument was assessed using the Content 
Validity Ratio (CVR), an approach described by Lawshe (1975).  Content validity 
is where test items reflect the knowledge required for a given topic area (e.g., 
evolution). The CVR method is a widely used method for gauging agreement 
among raters, or judges, regarding how essential each item is. This method 
utilized a group of subject-matter experts (SMEs) who were asked whether or not 
each item on the assessment is essential (Lawshe, 1975). Each panel member was 
asked: “Is the skill or knowledge measured by this item ‘essential’, ‘useful, but 
not essential’, or ‘not necessary to the performance of the construct’?” Lawshe 
argues that if more than half the panelists indicate that an item is essential, that 
item has at least some content validity. Basically, greater levels of content validity 
exist as greater numbers of panelists agree that an item is essential. The CVR for 
each item in the measurement instrument is calculated as follows: 
CVR = (Ne – N/2)/(N/2) 
 
Where: 
CVR= content validity ratio 
Ne = number of subject matter expert panelists indicating “essential” 
N= total number of SME panelists 
 
Values from this formula range from +1 to -1; positive values indicate that at least 
half the subject matter experts rated the item as essential. The mean CVR across 
the three questions may then be used as an indicator of overall test content 
validity. The minimum value of the CVR is to make sure that agreement is 
unlikely to be due to chance is 0.99 for five panelists. For this study, a panel of 
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five biology professors from the Math and Science department at GateWay 
Community College established a content validity of this assessment with an 
overall mean CVR of 1.0. Reliability has not yet been established for this 
instrument.  
 
Research Questions 
The purpose of this study was two-fold. The first goal was to develop a valid 
and reliable instrument to measure learning in the specific domain of the 
biological process of Natural Selection. The second goal was to examine the role 
of prior knowledge, gender and religious beliefs on the effectiveness of learning 
and collaboration. Four research questions were analyzed: 
1. Does the quality of collaboration have an effect on learning concepts 
about Natural Selection at the individual level and/or at the group level? 
2. In a collaborative setting, does the difference in prior knowledge increase 
learning concepts about Natural Selection at the individual level and/or at 
the group level? 
3. In a collaborative setting, does sex have an effect on learning concepts 
about Natural Selection at the individual level and/or at the group level? 
4. In a collaborative setting, do religious beliefs have an effect on learning 
concepts about Natural Selection at the individual level and/or at the group 
level? 
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Data Analysis 
In this dissertation, learning was defined by a difference of scores on 
assessments. Each research question was examined at two levels, learning at the 
individual level and the group level. The individual level was measured using two 
assessments. The first assessment was the CINS, developed by a science 
education researcher and used in many education studies (Anderson, Fisher & 
Norman, 2002). I developed the second assessment, the Mental Model Task, and 
it was also used to measure individual learning. The reason I used two 
assessments was to compare my new assessment, the Mental Model Task, against 
a tool that has already been established. Group learning is also measured for each 
research question. This was measured using a collaborative task. Coleman, Brown 
& Rivkin developed the collaborative task (1997). 
Before analyzing the three collaborative input factors (prior knowledge, 
gender and religious beliefs), I wanted to validate the theoretical framework for 
this research by confirming that students that participate in collaborative learning 
will learn more than students that do not collaborate. To test this, I compared 
students that participated in high quality collaboration versus students that 
participated in low quality collaboration. To validate the theory, I grouped dyads 
into two groups: effective collaborators and ineffective collaborators. Using an 
ANOVA model, I was able to compare the two groups to answer the first research 
question: Does the quality of collaboration have an effect on learning concepts 
about Natural Selection at the individual level and/or at the group level? To detect 
a difference in learning between the two groups at the individual level, I 
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performed an ANCOVA using the scores from the CINS and the Mental Model 
Task, using the pretests for the covariate.  In addition, I created a Mental Model 
Profile by graphing the mean scores from the Mental Model Task from the three 
days. This profile allowed me to observe the pattern of how the participant’s 
mental models changed while undergoing the intervention. Then I performed an 
ANOVA on the scores from the collaborative problem to detect a difference in 
learning between effective collaborators versus ineffective collaborators at the 
group level.  
The theoretical framework for this dissertation was based on the theory that 
collaboration evokes learning. The goal of this research is to identify which 
factor(s) is(are) responsible for enhancing learning. To answer research questions 
2, 3 and 4, I attempted to analyze the relationship between three collaborative 
factors and learning in a collaborative setting, at the individual level as well as the 
group level.  
Question 2 pertained to prior knowledge. Specifically, the question was: Does 
the difference in prior knowledge increase learning concepts about Natural 
Selection at the individual level and/or at the group level? The prediction for this 
question was based on theories constructed from research pertaining to 
heterogeneous groups and the beneficial effects of controversy and/or 
argumentation during learning.  The prediction was that dyads with dissimilar 
prior knowledge would perform better on the assessments. To analyze the 
relationship between prior knowledge and collaborative learning, each dyad was 
placed into one of the two groups, either a similar prior knowledge group or a 
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dissimilar prior knowledge group. I used an ANCOVA model to detect any 
learning differences based on prior knowledge differences. For the ANCOVA, I 
used the scores from the CINS and the Mental Model Task, using the pre-test 
scores as the covariate. Also, I created a Mental Model Profile by graphing the 
mean scores from the Mental Model Task from the three days to observe the 
pattern of mental model change. Lastly, to detect any learning differences at the 
group level, I performed an ANOVA using the collaborative problem scores.  
The third research question pertained to gender differences. The question was: 
In a collaborative setting, does gender have an effect on learning concepts about 
Natural Selection at the individual level and/or at the group level? From the 
literature, it was difficult to predict the outcome. In Woolley’s study (2010), 
groups with females outperformed groups with males. She attributed this to the 
theory that females were more socially sensitive. However, other studies, such as 
Baker’s study, groups with males outperformed groups with females. Baker 
attributed this to a disadvantage to females when in a predominantly male field 
(2007). To answer this question I used an ANCOVA model to compare females 
and males. To detect if there was a difference in learning at the individual level, I 
used the scores from posttest on the CINS and the Mental Model Task, with the 
scores on the pretest for the covariate. I also created a Mental Model Profile by 
graphing the mean scores from the Mental Model Task from the three days. This 
profile allowed me to observe the pattern of how the participant’s mental models 
changed while undergoing the intervention. To detect if there was a difference in 
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learning at the group level, I used the scores from the collaborative problem-
solving task.  
The last research question pertained to religious beliefs of the collaborators. 
The question was: In a collaborative setting, do religious beliefs have an effect on 
learning concepts about Natural Selection at the individual level and/or at the 
group level? At the individual level I specifically analyzed the effect of the 
acceptance or rejection of evolution on learning complex content pertaining to the 
process of Natural Selection. To do this, I performed an ANCOVA using the 
scores from the CINS and the Mental Model Task, with the pretests as the 
covariate. In addition, I created a Mental Model Profile by graphing the mean 
scores from the Mental Model Task from the three days. This profile allowed me 
to observe the pattern of how the participant’s mental models changed while 
undergoing the intervention. Finally, to analyze the effect of religious beliefs on 
group composition, I grouped participants into different combinations based on 
their religious beliefs. To analyze the effect of differences or similarities in 
religious beliefs in a collaborative setting, I performed an ANOVA using the 
scores from the collaborative problem-solving task to detect any differences 
between the groups. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
This chapter presents the quantitative analysis of the study in an attempt to 
examine the relationship between collaborative factors and learning the biological 
process of Natural Selection in a collaborative setting.  In my study, learning is 
defined by a difference in scores on assessments. The measurement strategies and 
experimental approach to answer the research questions were described in 
Chapter 3. This chapter will focus on presenting the data. This dissertation is 
based on the theory that students who learn interactively have an advantage 
compared to students who learn alone. To verify this assumption, the first analysis 
was an analysis on the quality of collaboration. Following this, I analyzed three 
different collaborative factors (prior knowledge, gender and religious beliefs) to 
measure if they had a positive effect on learning. Each analysis investigated 
learning at two levels, the individual level and at the group level. The Statistical 
Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) was used to do the data analysis. The 
assessment at the individual level was performed using two measurement tools, a 
Conceptual Inventory of Natural Selection (CINS) developed by (Anderson et al., 
2002) and a Mental Model Task developed by me. The assessment at the group 
level was performed using a problem-solving task developed by (Coleman et al., 
1997).  Chapter 5 will analyze the meaning of these findings for the broader study 
in collaborative learning in science education. 
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Quality of Collaboration and Collaborative Learning 
Individual Level  
A one-way analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was conducted to evaluate 
the relationship between the quality of collaboration and individual learning. The 
independent variable, the quality of collaboration, included two levels: effective 
and ineffective. Each dyad was placed into one of the two groups. Dyads were 
placed into the effective group based on the following three criteria: 1) they had to 
collaborate for at least 20 min, 2) both collaborators had to agree that both 
contributed equally to the content of the problem and 3) the dyad had to display 
equal contribution and collaborative discourse, observed by the instructor and the 
researcher. The dependent variable was the post-test score on the CINS and the 
covariate was the pre-test score on the CINS. A preliminary analysis evaluating 
the homogeneity-of-slopes assumption indicated that the relationship between the 
covariate and the dependent variable did not differ significantly as a function of 
the independent variable, F(1,138) = 1.69, MSE = 128.73, p = .195, partial n2 = 
.012. The ANCOVA was not-significant, F(1,139) = 2.35, MSE = 129.37, p = 
.128 (Figure 4.1). Sample size, as well as means and standard deviations are 
reported in Table 4.1.  
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Figure 4.1. Mean Post Test scores on CINS for ineffective and effective dyads. 
Table 4.1 
Descriptive Statistics for the scores on the CINS for the two groups 
Group N Mean SD 
 Effective 73 57.22 21.52 
 Ineffective 69 50.51 17.36 
 
In a second analysis at the individual level, an ANCOVA was performed 
to evaluate the results from the Mental Model Task. In this case the dependent 
variable was the Mental Model Task z-score taken on the last day of the 
experiment. This score was calculated by computing the Pearson’s correlation (r) 
between each individual mental model aligned with the expert mental model. The 
sampling distribution of Pearson’s r is not normally distributed; therefore the 
statistic was transformed to Fisher’s z. This converts Pearson’s r to the normally 
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distributed variable z. The covariate was the z-scores calculated from the Mental 
Model Task taken on the first day of the experiment. A preliminary analysis 
evaluating the homogeneity-of-slopes assumption indicated that the relationship 
between the covariate and the dependent variable did not differ significantly as a 
function of the independent variable, F(1,138) = .154, MSE = .027, p = .695, 
partial n2 = .001. Similar to the CINS results, the ANCOVA was not-significant, 
F(1,139) = 2.97, MSE = .027, p = .087 (Figure 4.2).  Sample sizes, as well as 
means and standard deviations are reported in Table 4.2. 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Mean Test scores on the Mental Model Task for ineffective and 
effective dyads. 
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Table 4.2  
Descriptive Statistics for scores on the Mental Model Task for the two groups 
Group N Mean SD 
 Effective 73 18.16 20.63 
 Ineffective 69 16.72 13.81 
 
A Mental Model Profile was created to analyze the data from the Mental 
Model Task. Of specific interest was the pattern of learning determined by the 
changes in the mental model of the participants. Data points were taken on three 
separate days to track changes in mental models as students participated in the 
intervention. Correlations (r) were calculated between each participant mental 
model to an expert mental model. To normalize the data, the statistic r was 
transformed into a Fisher’s z.  To create the profile, mean z scores were graphed 
for both groups (effective collaborators and ineffective collaborators) for Day1, 
Day2, and Day3 (Figure 4.3). For Day 1, the total mean for z scores was 14.77 
with a standard deviation of 8.5. For Day 2, M = 14.02 and SD = 8.7. For Day 3, 
M = 17.40 and SD = 17.3.  
To compare groups, the slope (m) was calculated for each group to 
represent the learning trend between each time point. Specifically, slopes 
represent the change in correlation between the participant mental models 
compared to the expert mental model. Between Day1 and Day2, the trend for the 
effective group (m = -0.87) and the ineffective group (m = -0.64) had a decrease 
in learning. Between Day2 and Day3, both groups had an increase in the learning 
trend. Although not significant, the effective group trended higher (m = 4.46) 
compared to the ineffective group (m = 2.19).  
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Figure 3.3. Mental Model Profile was created using the mean z scores for Day1, 
Day2 and Day 3 from the Mental Model Task for ineffective and effective dyads. 
 
Group Level 
A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to evaluate the 
relationship between the quality of collaboration and learning at the group level. 
The independent variable, the quality of collaboration, included two levels: 
effective and ineffective. The dependent variable was the score from the problem-
solving task collaboratively performed by each dyad.  The ANOVA was 
significant, F(1,140) = 37.5, MSE = 391.44, p = .000, (Figure 4.4). The strength 
of relationship between the quality of collaboration and the score on the 
collaborative task, assessed by n2, was strong, with the quality of collaboration 
accounting for 21% of the variance of the dependent variable.  Sample sizes, 
means and standard deviations are reported in Table 4.3. 
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Figure 4.4. Collaborative problem scores between ineffective groups verses 
effective groups. 
 
Table 4.3 
Descriptive Statistics for the scores on the Group Learning Assessment for the 
two groups 
Group N Mean SD 
 Effective 73 48.95 20.95 
 Ineffective 69 28.60 15.75 
 
 In conclusion, individual learning is unaffected by the quality of 
collaboration. However, the quality of collaboration does affect the learning 
outcome at the group level. In other words, if the collaboration is effective then 
the group outcome is increased.  
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Prior Knowledge and Collaborative Learning 
Individual Level  
An ANCOVA was conducted to evaluate the relationship between the 
similarity in prior knowledge between collaborators and their individual learning. 
The independent variable, prior knowledge similarity, included two levels: similar 
metal models between collaborators or dissimilar mental models between 
collaborators. The similarity in prior knowledge between collaborators was 
determined by using the information from the Mental Model Task on Day 2. I was 
able to correlate mental models between participants to determine if a dyad 
contained significantly correlated mental models putting them into the similar 
prior knowledge group or if a dyad contained non-significantly correlated mental 
models, putting them into the dissimilar prior knowledge group. The dependent 
variable was the post-test score on the CINS with the covariate being the pre-test 
score on the CINS. A preliminary analysis evaluating the homogeneity-of-slopes 
assumption indicated that the relationship between the covariate and the 
dependent variable did not differ significantly as a function of the independent 
variable, F(1,138) = 1.01, MSE = 131.24, p = .315, partial n2 = .007. The 
ANCOVA was not-significant, F(1,139) = .319, MSE = 131.25, p = .573, partial 
n
2
 = .002 (Figure 4.5). The descriptive statistics are reported in Table 4.4. 
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Figure 4.5. Mean Post Test scores on CINS for participants in a dyad with similar 
prior knowledge and participants in a dyad with dissimilar prior knowledge. 
Table 4.4 
Descriptive Statistics for the scores on the CINS for the two groups 
Group N Mean SD 
 Similar Prior Knowledge 76 55.72 19.33 
 Dissimilar Prior Knowledge 66 52.04 20.41 
 
 In a second analysis at the individual level, an ANCOVA was performed 
to evaluate the results from the Mental Model Task. In this case the dependent 
variable was the Mental Model Task z-score taken on the last day of the 
experiment. This score was calculated by computing the Pearson’s correlation (r) 
between each individual mental model aligned with the expert mental model. 
Then, transforming the Pearson’s r to the normally distributed variable z. The 
covariate was the z-score calculated from the Mental Model Task taken on the 
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first day of the experiment. A preliminary analysis evaluating the homogeneity-
of-slopes assumption indicated that the relationship between the covariate and the 
dependent variable did not differ significantly as a function of the independent 
variable, F(1,138) = .007, MSE = .028, p = .933, partial n2 = .001. Similar to the 
CINS results, the ANCOVA was not-significant, F(1,139) = .047, MSE = .028, p 
= .829, partial n2 = .00 (Figure 4.6).  Sample sizes, as well as means and standard 
deviations are reported in Table 4.5. 
 
Figure 4.6. Mean z scores from the Mental Model Task for participants in a dyad 
with similar prior knowledge and participants in a dyad with dissimilar prior 
knowledge. 
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Table 4.5 
Descriptive Statistics for the scores on the Mental Model Task for the two groups 
Group N Mean SD 
 Similar Prior Knowledge 76 18.55 16.91 
 Dissimilar Prior Knowledge 66 16.08 17.12 
 
A Mental Model Profile was created to analyze the data from the Mental 
Model Task. Of specific interest was the pattern of learning determined by the 
changes in the mental model of the participants. Data points were taken on three 
separate days to track changes in mental models as students participated in the 
intervention. Correlations (r) were calculated between each participant mental 
model to an expert mental model. To normalize the data, the statistic r was 
transformed into a Fisher’s z.  To create the profile, mean z scores were graphed 
for both groups (similar prior knowledge and dissimilar prior knowledge) for 
Day1, Day2, and Day3 (Figure 4.7). For Day 1, the total mean for z scores was 
14.77 with a standard deviation of 8.5. For Day 2, M = 14.02 and SD = 8.7. For 
Day 3, M = 17.40 and SD = 17.3.  
To compare groups, the slope (m) was calculated for each group to 
represent the learning trend between each time point. Specifically, slopes 
represent the change in correlation between the participant mental models 
compared to the expert mental model. Between Day1 and Day2, the trend for the 
similar prior knowledge group (m = 0.13) slightly increased where the dissimilar 
prior knowledge group (m = -1.74) decreased. Between Day2 and Day3, both 
groups had an increase in the learning trend, although not significant. The 
dissimilar group had the larger slope (m = 5.18) and the similar group had the 
smaller slope (m = 1.81).  
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Figure 4.7. Mean z scores from the Mental Model Task for collaborators with 
similar prior knowledge and dissimilar prior knowledge. 
Group Level 
An ANOVA was conducted to evaluate the relationship between similarity 
in prior knowledge and learning at the group level. The independent variable, 
prior knowledge similarity, included two levels: similar mental models and 
dissimilar mental models. The dependent variable was the score from the 
problem-solving task collaboratively performed by each dyad.  The ANOVA was 
not significant, F(1,140) = .188, MSE = 495.7, p = .66, partial n2 = .001 (Figure 
4.8). Sample sizes, means and standard deviations are reported in Table 4.6. 
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Figure 4.8. Collaborative problem scores for dyads with similar prior knowledge 
and dyads with dissimilar knowledge. 
 
Table 4.6 
Descriptive Statistics for the scores on the Group Learning Assessment for the 
two groups 
Group N Mean SD 
 Similar Prior Knowledge 76 39.82 20.01 
 Dissimilar Prior Knowledge 66 38.19 24.60 
 
 In conclusion, similarity in prior knowledge does not play a role in 
learning at the individual level or at the group level. Therefore, we can conclude 
that grouping students based on prior knowledge similarity will not have an effect 
on learning.  
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Sex and Collaborative Learning 
 There was a higher proportion of males in the upper division course, 26 of 
the total 53 that participated (49%), and only 16 of the total 89 females in the 
study (18%), (Figure 3.7).  The other six lower-division courses combined 
contained 51% of the males and 82% of the females (Figure 3.8). 
 
Figure 4.9 Male/Female ratio for pre-nursing courses: BIO156, BIO202 and 
BIO205 
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Figure 4.10 Male/Female ratio for upper division biology course: BIO440 
 
Individual Level  
An ANCOVA was conducted to evaluate the relationship between sex and 
individual learning. The independent variable, sex, included two levels: male and 
female. The dependent variable was the post-test score on the CINS and the 
covariate was the pre-test score on the CINS. A preliminary analysis evaluating 
the homogeneity-of-slopes assumption indicated that the relationship between the 
covariate and the dependent variable did not differ significantly as a function of 
the independent variable, F(1,138) = .019, MSE = 128.49, p = .891, partial n2 = 
.001. The ANCOVA was significant, F(1,139) = 4.33, MSE = 127.58, p = .039, 
partial n2= .03 (Figure 4.11). Males had the larger mean compared to females; the 
descriptive statistics are reported in Table 3.7. 
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Figure 4.11. Mean Pre and Post Test scores on CINS for females and males. 
Table 4.7 
Descriptive Statistics for scores on the CINS for the two groups  
Group N Mean SD 
 Males 53 62.36 19.23 
Females 89 49.04 18.61 
 
 In a second analysis at the individual level, an ANCOVA was performed 
to evaluate the results from the Mental Model Task. In this case the dependent 
variable was the Mental Model Task z-score taken on the last day of the 
experiment. This score was calculated by transforming the Pearson’s correlation 
(r) to Fisher’s z. The covariate was the z-score calculated from the Mental Model 
Task taken on the first day of the experiment. A preliminary analysis evaluating 
the homogeneity-of-slopes assumption indicated that the relationship between the 
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covariate and the dependent variable did not differ significantly as a function of 
the independent variable, F(1,138) = .002, MSE = .028, p = .968, partial n2 = .001. 
This analysis differed from the CINS results, the ANCOVA was not-significant, 
F(1,139) = .043, MSE = .028, p = .836, partial n2 = .001 (Figure 4.12).  The 
means on the last day were the same for males and female. Sample sizes, as well 
as means and standard deviations are reported in Table 4.8. 
 
Figure 4.12. Mean z scores from the Mental Model Task for sex. 
Table 4.8 
Descriptive Statistics for the scores on the Mental Model Task for the two groups 
Group N Mean SD 
 Males 53 18.51 15.40 
Females 89 16.74 18.21 
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A Mental Model Profile was created to analyze the data from the Mental 
Model Task. Of specific interest was the pattern of learning determined by the 
changes in the mental model of the participants. Data points were taken on three 
separate days to track changes in mental models as students participated in the 
intervention. Correlations (r) were calculated between each participant mental 
model to an expert mental model. To normalize the data, the statistic r was 
transformed into a Fisher’s z.  To create the profile, mean z scores were graphed 
for both groups (males and females) for Day1, Day2, and Day3 (Figure 4.13). For 
Day 1, the total mean for z scores was 14.77 with a standard deviation of 8.5. For 
Day 2, M = 14.02 and SD = 8.7. For Day 3, M = 17.40 and SD = 17.3.  
To compare groups, the slope (m) was calculated for each group to 
represent the learning trend between each time point. Specifically, slopes 
represent the change in correlation between the participant mental models 
compared to the expert mental model. Between Day1 and Day2, the trend for the 
males (m = -0.35), and the females (m = -0.97) had a slight decrease in learning. 
Between Day2 and Day3, all both groups had an increase in the learning trend. 
Although not significant, females had the larger slope (m = 3.88) and males had 
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the smaller slope (m = 2.53). 
 
Figure 4.13. Mean z scores from the Mental Model Task for females and males. 
Group Level 
An ANOVA was conducted to evaluate the relationship between group 
composition based on gender and learning at the group level. The independent 
variable, group composition, included three levels: male-male, female-female and 
male-female. The dependent variable was the score from the problem-solving task 
collaboratively performed by each dyad.  The ANOVA was not significant, 
F(1,149) = .1.79, MSE = 487.36, p = .170, partial n2 = .025 (Figure 4.14). Sample 
sizes, means and standard deviations are reported in Table 4.9. 
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Figure 4.14 Collaborative problem scores for male-male dyads, female-female 
dyads and male-female dyads. 
Table 4.9 
Descriptive Statistics for the scores for the Group Learning Assessment for the 
three groups 
Group N Mean SD 
 Male-Male 20 35.28 19.36 
 Female-Female 68 40.09 23.57 
 Male-Female 54 45.79 23.66 
 
From this analysis, it is difficult to assess the effect of sex on learning at 
the individual level because the two individual assessments concluded with 
different results. The CINS resulted in a significant difference between males and 
females, with males outperforming the females. The Mental Model Task resulted 
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with males and females performing similarly but females showing a larger 
learning slope according to the Mental Model Profile. At the group level, there 
was no significant difference between the groups; therefore it is difficult to 
determine any advantage to the group composition based on sex. 
 
Religious Beliefs and Collaborative Learning 
Individual Level  
 An ANCOVA was conducted to evaluate the relationship between 
religious beliefs and individual learning. The independent variable, religious 
beliefs, included three levels: evolutionist, creationist and blend. Participants who 
believe that human beings have developed over millions of years from less 
advanced forms of life without the help of God’s guidance were categorized as 
evolutionists.  Students who believe that God created human beings pretty much 
in their present form were categorized as creationists and students that believe that 
human beings have developed over millions of years from less advanced forms of 
life, but God guided this process were categorized as blend. All participants were 
randomly assigned to dyads. There were six possible combinations of dyads based 
on individual religious beliefs. The dependent variable was the post-test score on 
the CINS and the covariate was the pre-test score on the CINS. A preliminary 
analysis evaluating the homogeneity-of-slopes assumption indicated that the 
relationship between the covariate and the dependent variable did not differ 
significantly as a function of the independent variable, F(2,136) = .247, MSE = 
128.3, p = .782, partial n2 = .004. The ANCOVA was significant, F(2,138) = 
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3.038, MSE = 126.9, p = .05, partial n2 = .042 (Figure 4.15).  The evolutionists 
had the largest mean compared to the blend group and the creationist group. Post 
hoc analyses to the ANCOVA for the CINS scores consisted of conducting 
pairwise comparisons to find which belief affected learning most strongly. The 
evolutionist group produced significantly higher scores on the CINS in 
comparison with either of the other two groups. The creationist and the blend 
group were not significantly different from each other. The descriptive statistics 
are reported in Table 4.10. 
 
Figure 4.15. Mean Post Test scores on CINS for participants with evolutionist, 
creationist and blend beliefs. 
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Table 4.10 
Descriptive Statistics for the scores on the CINS for the three groups 
Group N Mean SD 
 Blend beliefs 67 51.86 19.16 
 Evolutionist beliefs 45 63.00 18.84 
 Creationist beliefs 30 45.33 18.14 
 
 
 In a second analysis at the individual level, an ANCOVA was performed 
to evaluate the results from the Mental Model Task. In this case the dependent 
variable was the Mental Model Task z-score taken on the last day of the 
experiment. This score was calculated by computing the Pearson’s correlation (r) 
between each individual mental model aligned with the expert mental model. 
Pearson’s r was transformed to the normally distributed variable z. The covariate 
was the z-score calculated from the Mental Model Task taken on the first day of 
the experiment. A preliminary analysis evaluating the homogeneity-of-slopes 
assumption indicated that the relationship between the covariate and the 
dependent variable did not differ significantly as a function of the independent 
variable, F(2,136) = .060, MSE = .028, p = .942, partial n2 = .001. Unlike the 
CINS results, the ANCOVA was not-significant, F(2,138) = 1.88, MSE = .027, p 
= .156, partial n2 = .027 (Figure 4.16). Post hoc analyses to the ANCOVA for the 
scores from the Mental Model Task consisted of conducting pairwise comparisons 
to find which belief affected learning most strongly. The evolutionist group 
produced significantly higher scores on the Mental Model Task in comparison 
with either of the other two groups. The creationist and the blend group were not 
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significantly different from each other. Sample sizes, as well as means and 
standard deviations are reported in Table 4.11 
 
Figure 4.16. Mean z scores from the Mental Model Task for participants with 
evolutionist, creationist and blend beliefs. 
Table 4.11 
Descriptive Statistics for the scores on the Mental Model Task for the three 
groups 
Group N Mean SD 
Blend beliefs 67 14.97 14.22 
Evolutionist beliefs 45 22.48 22.71 
Creationist beliefs 30 15.23 12.50 
 
A Mental Model Profile was created to analyze the data from the Mental 
Model Task. Of specific interest was the pattern of learning determined by the 
changes in the mental model of the participants. Data points were taken on three 
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separate days to track changes in mental models as students participated in the 
intervention. Correlations (r) were calculated between each participant mental 
model to an expert mental model. To normalize the data, the statistic r was 
transformed into a Fisher’s z.  To create the profile, mean z scores were graphed 
for each group (evolutionists, creationist and the blend group) for Day1, Day2, 
and Day3 (Figure 4.17). For Day 1, the total mean for z scores was 14.77 with a 
standard deviation of 8.5. For Day 2, M = 14.02 and SD = 8.7. For Day 3, M = 
17.40 and SD = 17.3.  
To compare groups, the slope (m) was calculated for each group to 
represent the learning trend between each time point. Specifically, slopes 
represent the change in correlation between the participant mental models 
compared to the expert mental model. Between Day1 and Day2, the trend for the 
blend group (m = -1.03), the evolutionist group (m = -0.52) and the creationist 
group (m = -0.43) showed no change in mental models. Between Day2 and Day3, 
all three groups had an increase in the learning trend. Evolutionist had the largest 
slope (m = 6.4), creationists had a smaller slope (m = 3.45), and the blend group 
had the smallest slope (m = 1.32). As reported in the previous section, the 
evolutionists performed significantly higher compared than the creationist and the 
blend group. The effect size d of .30 indicates a medium effect.   
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Figure 4.17. Mean z scores from the Mental Model Task for participants with 
evolutionist, creationist and blend beliefs. 
 
Group Level 
An ANOVA was conducted to evaluate the relationship between religious 
beliefs and learning at the group level, more specifically, the impact of the 
combination of collaborator’s beliefs on collaboration. The independent variable, 
the combination of religious beliefs, included six levels: evolutionist-evolutionist, 
creationist-creationist, blend-blend, blend-evolutionist, blend-creationist and 
evolutionist-creationist. The dependent variable was the score from the problem-
solving task collaboratively performed by each dyad.  The ANOVA was not 
significant, F(5,136) = .620, MSE = 499.58, p = .685, partial n2 = 022 (Figure 
4.18). Sample sizes, means and standard deviations are reported in Table 4.12. 
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Figure 4.18. Collaborative problem scores for dyads with different combinations 
of religious beliefs. 
 
Table 4.12 
Descriptive Statistics for the scores on the Group Learning Assessment for the six 
groups 
Group N Mean SD 
Evolutionist-Evolutionist 18 39.18 25.28 
Creationist-Creationist 4 44.75 3.0 
Blend-Blend 42 37.84 19.70 
Blend-Evolutionist 26 44.12 24.40 
Blend-Creationist 24 33.77 16.71 
Evolutionist-Creationist 28 39.84 27.08 
 
 The sample sizes for the groups were too small so an additional analysis 
was necessary. An ANOVA was conducted. The independent variable was the 
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similarity or dissimilarity in religious beliefs and the dependent variable was the 
score from the problem-solving task. The ANOVA was not significant, F(1,140) 
= .040, MSE = 496.2, p = .841, partial n2 = .00 (Figure 4.19). Sample sizes, means 
and standard deviations are reported in Table 4.13. 
 
Figure 4.19. Collaborative problem scores for dyads with the same beliefs and 
dyads with different beliefs. 
 
Table 4.13 
Descriptive Statistics for the scores on the Group Learning Assessment for the 
two groups 
Group N Mean SD 
 Similar Religious Beliefs 64 38.65 20.69 
 Dissimilar Religious Beliefs 78 39.40 23.48 
In conclusion, at the individual level, religious beliefs have an influence 
on learning about the biological process of Natural Selection as measured by the 
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CINS. There was a significant difference between students that were categorized 
as evolutionists compared to creationist and students with a blended belief. The 
students that were categorized as evolutionists outperformed the other two groups. 
Further studies are necessary to understand the relationship between religious 
beliefs and learning about evolution. Furthermore, on the Mental Model task, 
there was a trend. The evolutionists did better with a higher learning slope, 
although it was not significant.  Lastly, at the group level, there was no significant 
difference between the groups. Therefore it is difficult to determine any advantage 
to the group composition based on religious beliefs 
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
The research in this dissertation was based on the theory that students 
learn more in a collaborative setting. This theory was tested and validated by 
numerous studies presented in the education literature (Dolmans & Schmidt, 
1996; Ebert-May et al., 1997 ). However, the analysis in my study suggested that 
a collaborative setting only benefits students if assessed at the group level. The 
analysis revealed that on the individual level, students in a high-quality 
collaboration had similar assessment scores compared to students who 
participated in a low quality collaboration.  
There are researchers who argued that some students do not benefit from 
participating in a collaborative setting because of a phenomenon called 
Collaborative Inhibition (Steiner, 1966). These arguments could explain why 
participants in my study involved with high quality collaboration didn’t 
outperform participants in low quality collaboration on the individual 
assessments. Firstly, unstructured collaboration does not guarantee improved 
learning (Dillenbourg, 2002). The theory of Cognitive Overhead of Coordination 
could cause the inhibition of successful collaboration (Steiner, 1972). In this 
coordination, collaborators must keep track of multiple pieces of information, 
including both their partners’ ideas and strategies for solving a problem as well as 
their own. In addition, the collaborators must keep track of turn taking, 
monitoring and incorporating contributions, which together can use too much 
cognitive resources inhibiting solving a problem. 
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Another theory called the Retrieval Strategy Disruption Theory can also 
explain why collaboration can be non-beneficial (Basden, Basden, Bryner, & 
Thomas, 1997). This theory posits that each individual learner has his or her own 
strategy of information retrieval. When working with another, differences in 
retrieval strategies could be disruptive (Basden, Basden, Bryner, & Thomas, 
1997).  Lastly, there are two social factors that could negatively influence 
collaborative success.  Williams (1981) described social loafing as a social factor 
that could hinder successful collaboration. He termed this the Free Rider 
Hypothesis. This is where individuals contribute less because there are others that 
can do the work (Nokes, Meade, & Morrow, in review; Williams, 1981). The 
second social factor that can affect collaborative learning is a difference in 
power/status. If a collaborator felt superior or inferior, this would affect the 
amount and type of contributions (Edmondson, 1999).  
 
Relationship between Prior knowledge and Collaborative Learning 
Prior knowledge has an effect on collaborative learning (Gijlers & Jong, 
2005).  Does grouping students based on the differences or similarities in prior 
knowledge effect collaborative learning? I predicted that students with differing 
prior knowledge would collaborate longer, and thus, potentially learn more. 
According to my analysis, this is not the case. The results revealed that similarity 
or dissimilarity in prior knowledge had no effect on learning when students were 
in a collaborative setting. Furthermore, there was no correlation between 
differences in prior knowledge and the length of time in collaboration. This 
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suggests that differing knowledge does not necessarily lead to more discussion. 
Therefore, grouping students based on similarity in prior knowledge will most 
likely not have an effect on student collaborative learning. 
Additionally, the results from the Mental Model Profile revealed an 
interesting pattern (Figure 3.7).  For all three days, participants involved in 
collaboration where they had similar prior knowledge scored above the mean and 
participants with dissimilar prior knowledge scored below the mean. However, 
the pattern of learning was different between the two groups. The slope between 
Day2 and Day3 for the dissimilar group (n = 5.18) trended higher, although not 
significant, than the similar group (n = 1.81). 
 
Relationship between Sex and Collaborative Learning 
In this dissertation research males were compared to females. Learning 
was measured as a difference in scores at the individual level as well as the group 
level. At the individual level, there was a significant difference found between 
males and females in favor of males, but only on the multiple-choice Conceptual 
Inventory of Natural Selection (CINS) test. This result was not seen on the Mental 
Model Task. This result can be interpreted one of two ways. The first 
interpretation is that the males did learn more about natural selection compared to 
the females and the Mental Model Task was not sensitive enough to detect the 
difference. This is a logical explanation because of the male/female ratio in the 
seven courses involved in the study. Of the seven courses, six courses were a 
lower-division biology courses taught at a community college where one was an 
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upper-division university biology course. There was a higher proportion of males 
in the upper division course, 26 of the total 53 that participated (49%), and only 
16 of the total 89 females in the study (18%), (Figure 4.9).  The other six lower-
division courses combined contained 51% of the males and 82% of the females 
(Figure 4.10). Students in the upper division biology course typically perform 
higher compared to the lower division courses. This uneven distribution may 
account for why males outperformed females overall.  
Furthermore, this uneven distribution highlights another known 
phenomenon, that males and females are still separated into male or female 
dominated fields (Murphy, Steele, & Gross, 2007). Of the six community college 
courses used in this study, five of them were pre-requisites for a nursing program. 
In these courses, the majority of the students were females, reflecting that nursing 
is a female dominated field. The upper division biology course had more males 
than females; this outcome supports the idea that more males are preparing for a 
career in science, historically dominated by males (see Figures 5.2 and 5.3). 
Among many explanations of the unequal distributions of males and females in 
math and science fields, one is that females are socialized, directly and indirectly, 
to avoid studies and jobs typically pursued by males (Baker, 1998; Murphy et al., 
2007). 
Another common sex bias seen in education is that, on average, males 
score higher on multiple-choice assessments (Murphy, 2011; Walstad & Robson, 
1997). For example, on the ACT and SAT, the oldest and most widely used 
college entrance exams, a gap exists with males outperforming females. This 
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persists across all other demographic factors, including socio economic status, 
parental education, grade point average, rank in class, and size of high school 
(Walstad & Robson, 1997). This is the second interpretation of the result that 
males scored significantly higher on the CINS and not the Mental Model Task. 
The Mental Model Task was a format unfamiliar to all participants so it 
eliminated the assessment advantages that can exist on multiple-choice tests.  
 
Relationship between Religious Beliefs and Collaborative Learning 
An interesting finding was the significant difference in scores, on the 
CINS and the Mental Model Task, with the evolutionist group scoring higher 
when compared to both the blend group (students who think evolution occurred 
with God’s help) and the creationist group. Because of the contradictions to 
Christian beliefs, teaching evolution in American schools has become 
controversial (Lawson & Worsnop, 1992). It is important for students to learn the 
details of Evolution Theory because the concept sets a foundation for 
understanding all emergent processes. The question I was trying to answer was: 
Can students that reject evolution because of Christian beliefs still learn about the 
biological process of Natural Selection? In the analysis, particularly from the 
Mental Model Task data, the answer is: yes, students with Christian beliefs can 
still learn the concept of the evolutionary process of Natural Selection. This is 
evident from the Mental Model Profile (Figure 3.15), because the creationist 
group had a positive slope from Day2 to Day3 (Table 5.1).  However, the 
interesting finding is that the evolutionist group started out higher than the two 
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groups on Day 1 and had the highest slope between Day 2 and Day 3, with a 
significantly higher mean on Day3. The learning pattern seen in the Mental Model 
Profile was different compared to the gender profile and the prior knowledge 
profile. With the gender and prior knowledge groups, the profile pattern was that 
the group starting below the mean on Day1 had a higher slope between Day2 and 
Day3.  
Table 5.1 
Slopes on the Mental Model Profile for the three groups 
Group n (Day1 to Day2) n (Day2 to Day3) 
Blend beliefs -1.03 1.32 
Evolutionist beliefs -0.52 6.40 
Creationist beliefs -0.43 3.45 
 
This pattern suggests that students that believe that evolution occurred 
without God’s guidance will enhance comprehension of the difficult topic of the 
biological mechanism of Natural Selection. A study by Brem and her colleagues 
provide an explanation (Brem et al., 2003), that evolutionists and creationists 
differed in their prior exposure to pro- and antievolution sources of information. 
She concluded that people seek out messages that align with their beliefs. For 
example, “evolutionists seek out classes, TV shows, internet sites and other 
outlets that feature proevolution messages, while creationists should do the same 
for antievolution messages” (Brem, Ranney & Schindel, 2003, pg. 182). This 
behavior would explain why evolutionists have a more developed mental model 
pertaining to the topic of evolution. Their prior knowledge will aid in learning 
more in the classroom. 
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 This study provides the groundwork for further research investigating the 
role of prior knowledge, gender and religious beliefs as mediators for changes in 
mental models and comprehension about the biological process of Natural 
Selection. The long-term goal is to develop a model of the collaboration 
mechanism that informs both cognitive learning theory and educational practice. 
Future research involves looking at collaborations in more detail with a 
qualitative analysis.  
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ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY 
 
Arizona State University 
Department of Education 
Tempe, AZ 85282 
 
You are being asked permission to use class materials for research that involves 
examining how people learn in collaborative situations.  We are investigating 
the topic of collaborative learning in order to further our understanding of its 
benefits. Your participation in the research study is completely voluntary.  
Please read the following information carefully.  Feel free to ask questions if 
you do not understand something. 
 
If you participate in this study, you will be asked to solve a problem with 
another participant. Part of participating in this study will involve you taking a 
pre and post-test and learning about Natural Selection. The total participation 
time will be approximately 3 hours of class time. The material and activities 
involved in this study is not part of the class curriculum and if you agree to 
participate then the survey, pretest, posttest and collaborative problem will be 
used as data and will be analyzed. In addition to the opportunity to learn about 
biological process of Natural Selection you will be entered into a lottery to 
possibly win a Visa card worth $50.00. 
 
Any and all information obtained from you during the study will be confidential.  
Your privacy will be protected at all times.  You will not be identified 
individually in any way as a result of your participation in this research.  You 
will be assigned a random identification number that you will put on the survey 
and all the assessments. The data collected however, may be used as part of 
publications and papers related to learning.  You must be at least 18 years old to 
participate. 
 
Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary.  You may refuse to 
participate in this research.  Such refusal will not have any effect on your class 
grade. If you begin to participate in the research, you may at any time, for any 
reason, discontinue your participation without any negative consequences. 
Please feel free to ask any questions about anything that seems unclear to you 
and to consider this research and consent form carefully before you sign. 
 
Participant’s signature___________________________________ 
 
 
Name (please print)______________________________________ 
 
 
Date___________________ 
 
 
If you have further questions about this research project, please contact the 
principal investigator, Stephanie Touchman at stephanie.touchman@asu.edu or 
faculty supervisor Dale Baker at dale.baker@asu.edu. If you have questions 
about your rights as a research participant or if you have a research related 
complaint please contact the Arizona State University Office of Research 
Integrity and Assurance at (480) 965-6788. 
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Evolution by Natural Selection 
What is evolution? It is a pattern that emerges through time. And what is the 
mechanism that produces the pattern we call evolution?  
This chapter introduces the mechanism, natural selection, which Darwin 
declared produces the pattern.  
 
Darwin’s Theory of Evolution by Natural Selection states that evolution 
(descent with modification) is the logical outcome of four principles.  
They are: 
1. Individuals within populations are variable. 
2. The variations among individuals are, at least in part, passed from parents 
to offspring. 
3. In every generation, some individuals are more successful at surviving and 
reproducing than others, (in other words, some individuals have a higher 
fitness). 
4. The survival and reproduction of individuals are not random; instead they 
are tied to the variation among individuals. The individuals with the most 
favorable variations, those who are better at surviving and reproducing, are 
naturally selected.  
If these four principles are true, then the composition of the population changes 
from one generation to the next. In the figure below it shows how Darwin’s 
theory might play out in a population of chilies eaten by packrats.  
 
Figure 3.1 
 
The logic is straightforward: If there are differences among the individuals in a 
population that can be passed on to offspring, and if there is differential success 
among those individuals in surviving and/or reproducing, then some traits will 
be passed on more frequently than others. As a result, the characteristics of the 
population will change slightly with each succeeding generation. This is 
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Darwinian evolution: gradual change in the proportions of groups in a 
population over time. 
 
Note that while the logic is straightforward it contains a subtlety that can cause 
confusion. To understand how natural selection works, we have to think 
statistically. The selection itself -the surviving and reproducing- happens to 
individuals, but what changes is populations. In the chilies example, Because of 
the differences in the taste (mild to hot), individuals within the same population 
varied in their chances of being eaten by a mouse.  The hot ones were less likely 
to be eaten, therefore reproduces more successfully. When they reproduced, they 
passed their hotness mutation to their offspring. In the next generation, then, 
there are a higher proportion of chilies carrying the hotness mutation compared 
to the generation before it. This change in the population is evolution by natural 
selection. 
 
Darwin referred to the individuals who are better at surviving and reproducing, 
and whose offspring make up a greater percentage of the population in the next 
generation, as more fit. In so doing he gave the everyday English words fit and 
fitness a new meaning. Darwinian fitness is the ability of an individual to survive 
and reproduce in its environment. 
 
An important aspect of fitness is its relative nature. Fitness refers to how well an 
individual survives and how many offspring it produces compared to other 
individuals of its species. Biologists use the word adaptation to refer to a trait or 
characteristic of an organism, like the hotness of the chilies, that increases its 
fitness relative to individuals without the trait.  
 
In the next section, we examine natural selection by reviewing the evolution of 
the beaks of the Galapagos finches, a result of a change in their environment. 
 
The Evolution of Beak Shape in Galapagos Finches 
Peter Grant and Rosemary Grant have been studying finches in the Galapagos 
Archipelago since 1973. Collectively, they are called Darwin’s finches; the birds 
are derived from a small flock that invaded the archipelago from Central 
America some 2.3 million years ago. The descendents of this flock today 
comprise 13 different species that live in the Galapagos, plus a 14th that lives on 
Cocos Island. As you can see from the figure below, the finches are similar in 
size and coloration, however they show remarkable variation in the size and 
shape of their beaks.  
Figure 3.2 
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The beak is the primary tool used by the birds in feeding, and the enormous 
range of beak shape of the Galapagos finches reflects the diversity of the foods 
they eat. The warbler finches feed on insects, spiders, and nectar; woodpecker 
and mangrove finches use twigs or cactus spines as tools to pry insect larvae or 
termites from dead wood; several ground finches in the genus Geospiza pluck 
ticks from iguanas and iguanas and tortoises in addition to eating seeds; the 
vegetarian finch eats leaves and fruits.  
 
The Grants’ team focused their observations on the medium ground finches on a 
little island called Daphne Major. The climate on this island is seasonal even 
though the location is equatorial. A warmer, wetter season from January through 
May alternates with a cooler, drier season from June through December. The 
vegetation consists of dry forest and scrub, with several species of cactus. Few 
finches migrate onto or off of the island and the population is small enough to 
study. In an average year, there are about 1,200 individual finches on the island. 
Medium ground finches live up to 16 years and their generation time is 4.5 
years.  
 
Medium ground finches are primarily seed eaters. The birds crack seeds by 
grasping them at the base of the bill and they applying force. The beak size is 
directly correlated to the size of seeds that the birds eat, birds with bigger beaks 
eat larger seeds and birds with smaller beaks eat smaller seeds.  There is 
variation in the beak depth in the medium ground finch population, ranging from 
6 mm as the smallest to 14 mm as the largest with an average of 9.5 mm.  In 
1977, there was a terrible drought. Instead of the normal 130 mm of rainfall 
during the wet season, the island only got 24 mm. Because of the drought, the 
plants made fewer flowers and fewer seeds. Over the course of 20 months, 84% 
of the medium ground finches died of starvation.  
 
As the drought wore on, not only the number, but also the types of seeds 
available changed dramatically. Before the drought, the seeds available to the 
finches had a range from small and soft seeds to large and hard seeds. The 
finches preferred the small and soft seeds. However, after the drought, there 
were only large and hard seeds that survived allowing only the birds with deeper 
beaks to eat and reproduce. The environment changed and this led to a change in 
the population. After the drought, the average beak size was 10.2 mm (9.5 mm 
before the drought), and the smallest size being 7 mm and the largest size being 
11.5 mm.  
 
From this research, and others similar to it, we are able to observe natural 
selection in progress. From this example we observed that there is a variation in 
beak size and shape, in addition to the fact that the characteristics of the beaks 
are heritable. Because of a change in the environment there was a selection 
pressure that effected which finches would survive and reproduce. As a result, 
the proportions of each beak size within the population changed.  
 
1. In the first example, what type of chili would the mouse most likely eat first? 
 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. What environmental event occurred during 1977 that affected the finches? 
 
________________________________________________________________ 
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Survey 
 
 
Participation number (Please remember this number!): 
 
 
Gender:  
 
Age: 
 
 
What program are you in? 
 
 
What biology courses have you taken? 
 
 
What is your ethnicity? 
 
 
What language do you speak at home? 
 
 
Which of the following statements comes closest to your views on the origin and 
development of human beings: 
 
_____   1) Human beings have developed over millions of years from less 
advanced forms of life, but God guided this process. 
 
_____   2) Human beings have developed over millions of years from less 
advanced forms of life, but God had no part in this process. 
 
_____   3) God created human beings pretty much in their present form at one 
time within the last 10,000 years or so.  
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Mental Model Task 
Test- Version C 
Arizona State University 
 
 
DIRECTIONS: The following three pages contain a list with pairs of terms pertaining to the 
biological process of Natural Selection.  Circle each pair of terms that have a strong relationship to 
each other. There is no right or wrong answer; this is based on your knowledge.  
 
 
EXAMPLE: 
 
1. Dog Cat 
2. Dog Bird 
3. Dog Fish 
4. Cat Bird 
5. Cat Fish 
6. Bird Fish  
 
Explanation:  
“Dog Cat” was circled because both animals are mammals and “Bird Fish” were circled because 
they are both non-mammals. 
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APPENDIX F 
CONCEPTUAL INVENTORY OF NATURAL SELECTION 
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APPENDIX G 
COLLABORATION SCORE SHEET 
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Class __________________________ 
 
Observer _______________________________ 
 
Instructions: 
While observing the student collaborations, there will be two categories to score.  
 
Equal Contribution Category 
First, you will be looking for equal contribution from both students in each 
dyad. When listening to the dialogue if you observe both participants contribute 
in regard to the content then they will be scored as a “yes” in this category, if 
you only hear contributions from one participant and the other is only listening 
and/or agreeing then they will be scored as a “no” in this category. 
 
Effective Collaboration Discourse Category 
Second, you will be looking for supportive language within each collaborative 
dyad. This is broken down to three types of utterances that can be observed. The 
utterances are acknowledgements (“ok” or “yeah” responses), repetitions  
(repeating back the previous statement), and restatements (rephrasing the 
previous statement). If you hear any of these utterances they will be scored a 
“yes” in this category, if none are observed then they will be scored a “no” in 
this category 
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APPENDIX H 
COLLABORATION PROBLEM SOLVING TASK 
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Numbers: _______________   _______________ 
 
Instructions: Please answer the following three questions 
together with your partner. After collaborating and agreeing, 
write the solution in the space provided below the question.  
 
Polar bears, bacteria and birds 
 
1. Using the theory of evolution through natural selection, 
please invent an explanation for how polar bears came to be 
white.  
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2. Using the theory of evolution through natural selection, 
please invent an explanation for why certain antibiotics that 
used to be able to kill off certain bacteria can stop being 
effective after a period of time.  
Hints:  
-An antibiotic rarely kills all the bacteria it is intended to. 
-The reproductive cycle of the bacteria is very short. Bacteria 
can progress through an immense number of generations in a 
short time. 
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3. Evolutionary biologists have been concerned about how 
certain structures such as wings have evolved. These biologists 
are concerned about what could have been the value of earlier 
wing-like structures. Why is this a matter of concern? 
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Rubric for Collaboration Task 
 
Class: ______________________ 
 
Dyad: ______________________ 
 
Numbers: _______________________          __________________________ 
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APPENDIX  J 
COLLABORATION EVALUATION SURVEY 
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Collaboration Evaluation Survey 
 
Participant number  ______________________________ 
 
 
1. Regarding the time, did you feel that both collaborators 
participated in the collaboration equally? Or was it one sided? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Regarding the content, did you feel that both collaborators 
participated in the collaboration equally? Or was it one sided? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Did you learn anything new that you didn’t know before the 
collaboration regarding the concept of Natural Selection? 
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